Projecting Payrolls: New York Mets
As we continue to wait for the new homes of Bryce Harper and Manny Machado, let’s move on to the 13th team payroll projection. Below find the links to the earlier posts in this series.
Philadelphia Phillies
Los Angeles Dodgers
Los Angeles Angels
Atlanta Braves
New York Yankees
Chicago White Sox
Boston Red Sox
Minnesota Twins
Milwaukee Brewers
San Francisco Giants
St. Louis Cardinals
Chicago Cubs
If you have questions about financial information made available to the public and the assumptions used in this series, please refer to the Phillies piece linked above.
Today, we look into a club that has surprised the baseball world move after move this winter: the New York Mets.
Team Leadership
Despite having been around for 57 seasons, the Mets have really had only three owners. They were founded as an expansion franchise in 1962 by Joan Payson with her widower running the show for five years after her death before he sold the club to publisher Nelson Doubleday’s company in 1980. Doubleday individually grabbed the club along with Fred Wilpon in 1986 and Wilpon, along with his business partners, bought out Doubleday in August 2002 with the Wilpon ownership group assuming full control. To say that Wilpon ownership got off to a bad start is quite an understatement as the team made just one trip to the playoffs from 2003-14, memorably falling to St. Louis in a seven-game NLCS in 2006 before a pair of heartbreakingly close playoff misses in 2007 and 2008. The club was rejuvenated, fueled by elite young pitching, in 2015, reaching the World Series and following that up with another playoff trip in 2016, albeit just a Wild Card Game loss.
Following an eight-year run during which Sandy Alderson rebuilt the club into a true contender, Wilpon went outside the box — way outside the box — and hired former Creative Artists Agency player agent Brodie Van Wagenen to be the new general manager in October 2018. Although his hiring was initially met with some skepticism and questions about possible conflicts of interest, Van Wagenen has set the baseball world on fire with a series of marquee moves, as we’ll discuss below.
Historical Payrolls
Before hitting the numbers, please recall that we use data from Cot’s Baseball Contracts, we’ll use average annual value (“AAV”) on historical deals but actual cash for 2019 and beyond, and deferrals will be reflected where appropriate. And, of course, the value of examining historical payrolls is twofold: they show us either what type of payroll a team’s market can support or how significantly a given ownership group is willing to spend. In the most useful cases, they show us both. We’ll focus on a 15-year span for the Mets, covering 2005-18 for historical data as a means to understanding year 15: 2019. This period covers nearly the entirety of Wilpon’s sole ownership, so this provides an excellent window into what to expect from the club. We’ll also use Opening Day payrolls as those better approximate expected spending by ownership.
Wilpon kept spending largely consistent during the early days of his sole ownership, but payroll jumped in a big way to fuel the successful teams of the late 2000s. As that roster aged and faded, the payroll dipped substantially, including a massive one-year drop of nearly $50 million before the 2012 season. Payroll largely stagnated until a return to significant spending in the 2016 season as the Mets attempted to return to the World Series, followed by another jump before the 2017 year.
The Mets paid a $1.1 million luxury tax bill for the 1999 season under the previous tax regime, but that was the only year in club history during which they’ve incurred the tax. They came in narrowly under the threshold in 2003 by less than $1 million, but they haven’t come particularly close to the tax line over the past 15 seasons. The club has regularly played in the international amateur space, though they’re not known for the type of boundary-pushing spending that teams like the Yankees, Red Sox, Dodgers, and Cubs have employed.
Future Liabilities
Mets spending in 2019 is set to take a new leap, setting a new franchise high by a solid margin. Unsurprisingly, a bevy of guaranteed deals lead the way.
Despite some huge numbers for Cespedes and Cano, the club is far from hamstrung by its current deals as there is very little money committed beyond the 2020 season.
Speaking of Cespedes, he provides unquestioned offensive firepower…when he’s on the field. Since being acquired by the Mets at the 2015 trade deadline, signing a new deal with the club before the 2016 season, opting out, and securing a long-term deal covering the 2017-20 years, Cespedes has blasted his way to a powerful .282/.346/.543 batting line. However, Cespedes has seen his games played dwindle each year, tumbling from 159 in 2015 to 132 in 2016, 81 in 2017, and finally just 38 last season. The front office has given repeated indications that any contribution from Cespedes in 2019 will be gravy given his lengthy recovery timeline following heel surgery.
While Cespedes has struggled to stay on the field, new Met Cano has been a picture of consistency, playing at least 156 games each year from 2007-16 before dipping all the way to 150 games in 2017. However, Cano was slapped with an 80-game suspension last year after a test revealed the presence of a diuretic in his system before undergoing arthroscopic knee surgery in December. It’s likely Van Wagenen’s tenure will be defined in large part by how Cano performs in his new (old) city. Regardless, from a purely financial standpoint, Cano represents a fairly safe risk: whenever he plays, he has been remarkably productive and if he fails another drug test, Cano will be suspended for an entire season without pay. It’s also worth noting that the Mariners are subsidizing Cano’s deal both by sending cash to the Mets annually and by absorbing the remaining amounts due to Jay Bruce and Anthony Swarzak. It should be noted that the most sought-after player in the Cano deal was reliever Edwin Diaz, who fell 13 days short of Super Two status for 2019 and will therefore earn just $570,800 in his first year with the Mets.
Among the guaranteed deals for current players, longtime Met Juan Lagares is the sole remaining holdover who spent a significant chunk of time under the Alderson regime. Lagares plays a mean center field and runs well, but his bat never developed, so it figures that the Mets will pay his 2020 salary and wish him well nine months from now.
The remaining players are all middle class veterans on short-term deals. Frazier and Vargas both enter their walk years while Van Wagenen filled out the remainder of his roster by throwing modest sums of cash at solid, unspectacular veterans. Lowrie enters off of a stellar year but turns 35 shortly after Opening Day. Ramos, Familia, and Wilson each enjoyed success in 2018 and prior years, though each comes with a recent red flag: a knee injury for Ramos, a domestic violence suspension for Familia, and a nightmarish loss of command in recent years for Wilson.
Finally, we get to the payments to ex-players, and holy smokes, what a walk down memory lane this is. Wright has two years remaining on his eight-year contract, though insurance figures to pay about 75 percent of his guaranteed money, after which the team owes him $3.1 million annually through 2025. Santana’s deferred money carries just two years into the future.
But Strawberry, Bonilla, and Saberhagen? They basically define the risk of long-term deferrals. The team will spend over $3 million on that trio through the 2020s while owing nearly $2.8 million to the Strawberry-Bonilla duo for additional years. It’s true that those dollar figures aren’t astronomical when considering team budgets, but $3 million represents an annual flier on someone like Shelby Miller or a modest bullpen upgrade like Shawn Kelley. Instead, the Mets will continue to spend that cash on players through their 60s. Yikes.
Turning to the arbitration ranks, the Mets feature their best talent:
deGrom and Syndergaard are arguably the team’s two best players. Wheeler finally recovered from a slew of injuries to realize his promise as a strong rotation cog, and Matz still carries plenty of promise to do the same. Conforto played at an All-Star level in 2017 before slipping to be a merely plus regular in 2018; he just turned 25. Only d’Arnaud figures to play a less than prominent role as his sterling 2015 becomes a thing of distant past more so than a predictor of future stardom. Nevertheless, the arbitration table carries much of the intrigue for the Mets in 2019 and beyond.
What Does Team Leadership Have to Say?
Wilpon didn’t offer much insight as to what team spending would look like early on in the offseason, stating only that “Brodie knows what the parameters of what the payroll is and what we’re planning to do.”
Accordingly, this pushes us toward Van Wagenen for insight on the team’s expected spending…which also yields no useful information. Back in November, the general manager stated that the club was “open for sure to moving money off the roster” but “willing to add money as well” before deferring more specific questions to ownership.
It seems that franchise leadership has no interest in making their spending plans public knowledge. For competitive advantage purposes, I can’t say I blame them.
Are the Mets a Player for Bryce Harper or Manny Machado?
Probably not. They haven’t been mentioned as one of the clubs seeking a sit-down opportunity with either mid-20s star and that speaks volumes, especially now that we’ve reached February.
Furthermore, following his expensive forays into the marketplace to acquire Cano and Familia, sources indicated that Van Wagenen would be focusing his efforts on an outfield bat, rotation depth, or a lefty reliever, not exactly an indication that Harper or Machado would be meeting with Mets brain trust in the near future.
Still, it can’t be ignored that Mets play in a major metropolitan area and feature a fan base that supported attendance totals regularly in excess of three million annually, even eclipsing four million fans in 2008. They exceeded 2.6 million fans only twice since then. If ownership and the business operations folks believe that a contending Mets team can draw at least 3.1 million fans like they did each year from 2006-09, that extra revenue could surely support another marquee addition, though doing so would push the team into taxpayer status depending on how Wright’s insurance coverage is factored. They currently have a tax payroll of approximately $186.5 million, meaning they can only afford a $20 million addition before exceeding the tax line.
For now, assume that the Mets are out on both players while holding a tiny glimmer of possibility in the back of your mind. While you hold onto that thought, consider this idle, baseless speculation: in addition to Wright’s, Cespedes’ contract is insured as well, though the Mets were hazy on the specifics. If they truly think that he’ll be unable to play at all in 2019 and the policy covers roughly 75 percent of his salary after a disability period is reached, the club may recover something north of $10 million on the policy. The prospect of another big expenditure starts to look eminently more reasonable.
What Will the 2019 Payroll Be?
Well, it’ll be a new team record, that’s for sure. But just how high will it go?
Currently, team payroll comes in at $159.5 million including the substantial payments of deferred money. The luxury tax won’t be a factor unless the team adds $20 million or more to current payroll, so this number is a good approximation.
How much room is there for additional expenditures? It seems reasonable to assume that Van Wagenen took the job with the understanding that payroll would increase by some amount, even if that amount is more in the five-to-ten percent neighborhood than something more substantial. A ten percent increase fits the bill as the club seeks to contend in their final years of depressed-cost control over deGrom and Syndergaard. But don’t be stunned if the percentage increase is more like fifteen or twenty in the end. For now, we’ll estimate at the low number.
Projected 2019 Payroll: $165 million
Projected 2019 Payroll Space: $5.5 million
Poll: Marwin Gonzalez’s Payday
29-year-old Marwin Gonzalez – he’ll be 30 by Opening Day – entered the offseason primed to a secure healthy payday from one of perhaps two dozen interested suitors around the league. Armed with gloves to play six positions, an incredibly goofy nickname christened by superagent Scott Boras, and the whiff of 2017’s 4.0 fWAR breakout still detectable to the sharpest of senses, Gonzalez’s camp has touted the longtime Astro as the right-sized plug to fill almost any hole.
But the market surrounding the Venezuelan-born infielder/outfielder, to this point in the offseason, has been exceedingly quiet – muzzled, even. The Braves, Padres, and Astros have all been connected to Gonzalez at various hot-stove junctures, though none seem particularly aggressive. Other teams, like the oft-linked Brewers and Cubs, or the MLBTR-projected Twins, seem to have no interest at all. Is the tepidity a product of an exorbitant Boras ask, or are teams just not nearly as enamored with “Swiss G” as originally surmised?
Gonzalez, who scuffled through seven minor league seasons before his 2012 debut with the Astros, has turned in a number of solid-to-good offensive seasons in the majors, posting above-league-average marks in four of the last five. His overhauled approach – more walks, fewer balls on the ground – has paid dividends as well, with the aforementioned 2017 breakout (.303/.377/.530) his career high-water mark. While not a multi-positional defensive wizard like Ben Zobrist, Gonzalez has acquitted himself well all across the diamond, and could conceivably be a full-time fit at second base, third, or in the corner outfield.
Still, one can’t exactly use a pen when projecting Gonzalez’s forthcoming production. The best utility men are at least competent at shortstop, and Gonzalez, who’s nearing the age at which range, in both the infield and outfield, declines precipitously, has been dreadful there. The track record, too, is a little light, and Steamer, arguably the standard in baseball’s forecasting industry, projects the utility man to post just 1.3 WAR this season (the number is closer to two when assuming full-time play).
In the free agent freeze of the last two offseasons, it’s the mid-tier player who’s been hurt the worst. Always reluctant to dish out the long term deal, teams now balk at even short-term ones for players whose production can safely be approximated by much cheaper, in-system options. Houston’s Tony Kemp, while probably not an option at shortstop, would seem to fit this bill, as would a number of others on suspected Gonzalez suitors around the league.
How Much Guaranteed Money Will Marwin Gonzalez Earn On His Next Deal?
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$11MM-20MM 39% (6,199)
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$1MM-10MM 26% (4,152)
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$21MM-30MM 24% (3,875)
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$31MM-40MM 8% (1,260)
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$41MM+ 3% (464)
Total votes: 15,950
MLBTR Originals
Rounding up the latest in original content from the MLBTR staff . . .
- Jeff Todd wrote in fascinating detail about the curiously team-friendly Whit Merrifield extension.
- Colorado’s Kyle Freeland turned in one of 2018’s most polarizing statistical outputs, notching 8.4 rWAR despite middling peripherals, even when adjusting for park (his 104 xFIP- checked in below the 100 league-average mark). Our Tim Dierkes took a closer look at potential extension figures for the 26-year-old lefty.
- The Red Sox have straddled the top bracket of the luxury tax for the offseason’s entirety, reluctant to eclipse the $246MM threshold and pay the hefty 75% tax for offenders. But couldn’t their shaky bullpen – arguably the defending champs’ only weakness – use a major upgrade? Steve Adams explored the situation and its many nuances on Friday.
- Connor Byrne’s piece on the worst bullpens of ’18 includes three teams with serious playoff aspirations in the upcoming campaign. Connor also took a peek at Nolan Arenado’s future in Colorado, where a major payday could severely hinder the team’s financial flexibility in the years to come, and asked readers to project the suddenly-imposing Luke Voit‘s 2019 output. Judging by the early poll returns, most MLBTR readers are not yet converts.
Poll: Projecting Luke Voit’s 2019
Among major leaguers who finished with at least 150 plate appearances in 2018, future Hall of Famer Mike Trout unsurprisingly led the way in wRC+ (191). But who finished second? Was it AL MVP Mookie Betts, NL MVP Christian Yelich or another big-name superstar? No, it was Luke Voit, who put up a 187 wRC+ in 161 PAs divided between the Cardinals and Yankees. Voit took a mere 13 trips to the plate until late July, when New York acquired him from St. Louis for a pair of relievers, and then proceeded to give the first baseman-needy Yankees an answer at the position over the final couple months of the season.
During his first 148 PAs as a Yankee, the burly, boisterous Voit batted a video game-like .322/.398/.671 with a Ruthian ISO (.350) and 15 home runs. And Statcast backed up Voit’s production, ranking the soon-to-be 28-year-old first in barrels per plate appearance and expected weighted on-base average (.437) among those who racked up at least 150 PAs on the season. While Voit benefited from a .365 batting average on balls in play, a number he may not approach again, the Yankees are understandably optimistic he’s good enough to serve as their No. 1 option at first going forward.
This has been an active offseason in the infield for New York, which has signed DJ LeMahieu and Troy Tulowitzki while showing interest in Manny Machado, but the team has been quiet at first base. Despite Voit’s limited track record, the right-handed slugger’s incredible showing toward the end of 2018 has made him the odds-on favorite to start at first in 2019 for the Yankees, whose previous long-term hope, the lefty-swinging Greg Bird, has fallen short of expectations because of a spate of injuries and less-than-stellar overall production. The Yankees have been bullish on Bird, but he missed all of 2016 because of a shoulder injury, and then produced very little from 2017-18 while dealing with foot problems. His horrific 2018 campaign made it necessary for the World Series-contending Yankees to address first, where they ultimately chose to turn to Voit over the summer.
While it’s still too soon to give up on the 26-year-old Bird, he may not receive regular playing time with the Yankees again unless Voit falls flat. Although Bird was a much better prospect than Voit during their younger days, there’s no doubt the latter has been the superior major leaguer to this point. Consequently, as the Yankees prepare for a championship push, they’ll continue with Voit at first, undoubtedly hoping last season wasn’t a mirage and they’ve acquired a star-caliber hitter for next to nothing.
The Steamer projection system doesn’t expect the 2019 version of Voit to serve as an offensive force, though, as it predicts he’ll wind up with an above-average but hardly world-beating .262/.335/.458 line. That would make for a .793 OPS, far better than what Yankees first basemen managed from 2016-18 but also much less impressive than the production Voit offered during his abbreviated showing last season. Now that he’s the Yankees’ preferred choice at first, how do you expect Voit to perform in 2019?
(link for app users)
Predict Luke Voit's 2019 OPS
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.800-.850 33% (4,599)
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.751-.799 33% (4,595)
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.750 Or Below 18% (2,591)
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.851-.899 10% (1,381)
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.900 Or Better 6% (883)
Total votes: 14,049
Photo courtesy of USA Today Sports Images.
Checking In On The Worst Bullpens Of 2018
The importance of having a dominant bullpen was on display in 2018, when four of the majors’ five best relief units in terms of fWAR helped pitch their teams to the postseason. On the other hand, four of the league’s five worst relief corps (and nine of the game’s bottom 10) watched the playoffs from home. So now, with the spring fast approaching, where do last year’s bottom-feeding bullpens stand? As you’ll see below, at least one has made major improvements this winter, but the rest look iffier. While there’s still time for these teams to add help from a free-agent class that remains awash with veterans, this quintet’s bullpen-related heavy lifting may be all but complete for the offseason.
Royals (minus-2.2 fWAR; projected season-opening bullpen via Jason Martinez of Roster Resource ): Going by fWAR, the Royals’ 2018 bullpen was among the five worst of the past decade, though the unit “only” posted the majors’ second-highest ERA (5.09) a year ago. Those hideous numbers came in spite of the presence of Kelvin Herrera, who logged a near-spotless 1.05 ERA over 25 2/3 innings before the Royals traded the then-pending free agent to the Nationals in June. They also came thanks in large part to Brandon Maurer, who’s now a Pirate after pitching to a ghastly 7.76 ERA/6.58 FIP in 31 1/3 innings out of Kansas City’s bullpen last season.
Heading into the upcoming campaign, there’s a lot of work to be done to turn this Herrera-less group into a strength, but the Royals haven’t addressed it in any major way this offseason. However, considering they’re coming off a 58-win season and also won’t approach contention in 2019, it’s not surprising the Royals have shied away from major league free agency. They’ve instead taken less expensive routes to acquire potential bullpen pieces, having pulled in Michael Ynoa on a minor league deal, Sam McWilliams and Chris Ellis in the Rule 5 Draft and Conner Greene via waivers. Unfortunately, going by ZIPS projections, no one from that quartet looks like a promising bet to produce much in 2019. Likewise, ZIPS doesn’t have particularly high hopes for the majority of the Royals’ bullpen holdovers from 2018. The system does, however, like 23-year-old left-hander Richard Lovelady – who has turned in excellent minor league numbers but hasn’t yet reached the majors.
Marlins (minus-2.1 fWAR; projected season-opening bullpen): At 5.34, the Marlins’ relief corps managed the game’s worst ERA last year and the sport’s third-highest mark since 2009. The main culprits were Ben Meyer, Junichi Tazawa and Tyler Cloyd, who combined for 56 2/3 innings and each registered an ERA of at least 8.68. Tazawa and Cloyd are now out of the organization. Meyer, meanwhile, is still around, but he’s not even on Miami’s 40-man roster. But neither is righty Nick Wittgren, who led Marlins relievers in ERA (2.94) and FIP (3.13) in 33 2/3 frames last year. The Marlins made the odd choice to designate the 27-year-old Wittgren for assignment earlier this week to make room for the signing of infielder Neil Walker, who’s six years Wittgren’s senior and only under control for one season. Other notable contributors no longer in the mix include Kyle Barraclough (who nosedived in 2018 and was dealt to the Nationals in October), Brad Ziegler (Miami traded him to Arizona last July, and he has since retired) and Javy Guerra (now a Blue Jay after putting up a 5.55 ERA in 2018).
The best returning pieces in Miami’s bullpen look to be Drew Steckenrider and Adam Conley, who each registered solid seasons in 2018. Otherwise, it’s a largely unproven cast – one that hasn’t picked up any major league free agents and seems likely to once again record below-average numbers this year. As with the Royals, the Marlins are rebuilding, so they’ve explored alternative paths for help. Thus far, they’ve acquired Nick Anderson (via trade with the Twins), Tyler Stevens (via trade with the Angels), minor league free agents R.J. Alvarez and Brian Moran, Rule 5 selection Riley Ferrell, and intriguing waiver claim Julian Fernandez.
Mets (minus-0.6 fWAR; projected season-opening bullpen): Unlike the Royals and Marlins, the Mets are making a real effort to win in 2019. As a result, the bullpen has been a key area of focus for new Mets general manager Brodie Van Wagenen, who has swung a blockbuster trade to reel in arguably the best closer in baseball (ex-Mariner Edwin Diaz) and spent a combined $40MM on free agents Jeurys Familia and Justin Wilson this winter. Diaz, Familia and Wilson will join Seth Lugo, who was outstanding in 2018, and Robert Gsellman to give the Mets no fewer than five capable relievers.
Perhaps the Mets will also benefit from less heralded pickups in Luis Avilan and Arquimedes Caminero, whom they signed to minors deals, and Rule 5 pick Kyle Dowdy. Regardless, New York’s new cast of relievers looks a whole lot better than last year’s bullpen, which relied too much on the likes of Paul Sewald, Jerry Blevins, Jacob Rhame, Tim Peterson and Anthony Swarzak, among other ineffective options, en route to a 4.96 ERA. Sewald, Rhame and Peterson are still in the organization, albeit as depth pieces, while Blevins and Swarzak are now gone. All things considered, ZIPS expects the Mets’ revamped bullpen to end up as one of the majors’ best in 2019.
Indians (plus-0.4 fWAR; projected season-opening bullpen): Cleveland found its way to another division title in 2018 despite its weak bullpen, which limped to a 4.60 ERA as innings leaders Cody Allen, Dan Otero, Zach McAllister, Neil Ramirez and Andrew Miller scuffled. Allen, McAllister and Miller are now gone, leaving the Indians with a bullpen that, in spite of the great Brad Hand‘s presence, still looks somewhat questionable. The club did well to re-up lefty Oliver Perez, whose 2018 renaissance earned him a guaranteed deal last month, though he’s the only major league free agent Cleveland has signed. The team also made a waiver claim for A.J. Cole, whose penchant for surrendering home runs led both the Nationals and Yankees to give up on him in the past eight months, and brought in veterans Justin Grimm and Brooks Pounders on minor league accords. Big league success has eluded Grimm and Pounders over the past couple years, however, so the Indians surely aren’t expecting significant contributions from either. Instead, their relief corps will count on returning Indians – potentially including flamethrower Danny Salazar, a starter from 2013-17 who missed all of last season because of shoulder problems. While Salazar could factor in at some point, it won’t be at the start of the season.
Nationals (plus-0.4 fWAR; projected season-opening bullpen): Washington, another prospective contender, has made a couple of interesting bullpen moves this offseason after last year’s underwhelming showing. In addition to trading for the hard-throwing Barraclough, who held his own from 2015-17, they inked fellow high-velocity righty Trevor Rosenthal to a $7MM guarantee in free agency. Rosenthal, 28, sat out all of last season while recovering from Tommy John surgery, but the former Cardinals closer was mostly tremendous out of their bullpen from 2012-17.
Should a healthy Rosenthal return to form, it would be an enormous boon for the Nationals, who saw a different ex-Cards reliever – Greg Holland – experience a rebirth in their uniform last season. But after logging a microscopic 0.84 ERA in 21 1/3 innings in D.C., Holland joined the Diamondbacks in free agency. The Holland-less Nats are now slated to rely mostly on elite but oft-injured closer Sean Doolittle, Barraclough, Rosenthal, Justin Miller, Koda Glover, Sammy Solis and Matt Grace, with Tanner Rainey (acquired from the Reds for Tanner Roark) and minor league signings Vidal Nuno and J.J. Hoover around as depth. All said, it’s a high-risk, high-reward bunch, given the injuries Doolittle and Rosenthal have dealt with and the up-and-down performances of Barraclough, Miller, Glover, Solis and Grace.
Poll: Nolan Arenado’s Future
Just one year from reaching free agency, Rockies third baseman Nolan Arenado may go down among the most coveted players ever to hit the open market – if he does, that is. The chances of Arenado shopping himself around the majors next winter seemingly took a hit Saturday when Rockies owner Dick Monfort expressed optimism about the club’s chances of locking the four-time All-Star up for the long haul.
“I think we’ve gotten it to the point where we’re to the finals. We’re to the crescendo,” Monfort told Thomas Harding of MLB.com in regards to extension talks with Arenado. Monfort added that he’s “comfortable that we can get a number that we can get to” for Arenado, who “wants this to happen as much as we do.”
The Rockies and Arenado have already held at least one meeting this week, during which they hammered out a record-setting, arbitration-avoiding agreement worth $26MM. It seems they also used that summit to discuss a long-term arrangement for Arenado. Regardless, the Rockies will no doubt need to hand Arenado a team-record pact – one that obliterates the $141.5MM guarantee they gave former first baseman Todd Helton in 2001 – to prevent their current franchise player from taking a stab at free agency.
Although they’ve historically been middle of the pack or lower when it comes to spending, the Rockies appear ready to pony up for Arenado. General manager Jeff Bridich said in December that the Rockies could afford a $200MM-plus contract for Arenado, and Monfort noted Saturday that revenue from their TV contract – which runs through 2020 – will jump from $20MM per annum to $40MM. That 100 percent increase, not to mention a new TV deal which the Rockies will begin negotiating in the summer, should only help the team’s chances of retaining Arenado.
For his part, Arenado may simply prefer the comfort of Colorado, where he has posted far better offensive numbers than on the road, to dealing with the free-agent process. The market has become increasingly unkind to players over the past couple offseasons, evidenced in part by the fact that in-their-prime superstars Bryce Harper and Manny Machado have been unemployed for three months. Harper and Machado are eventually going to rake in huge contracts, but with fewer suitors than expected, the duo may not do as well as predicted when the winter began. And while Harper hasn’t even played his age-26 season yet and Machado won’t turn 27 until July, Arenado will be on the verge of his age-29 campaign if and when he becomes a free agent.
Despite the age difference between him and the Harper-Machado tandem, Arenado’s certainly paying close attention to their free-agent forays. The more money Harper and Machado receive, the better it will be for Arenado, whose superb all-around track record gives him a strong chance of joining the $200MM club in the next 12 months. The main question is whether he’ll get that money from Colorado or another franchise. How do you expect it to play out?
(link for app users)
Will the 2019 season be Arenado's last in Colorado?
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Yes 55% (9,271)
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No. They'll re-sign him 45% (7,484)
Total votes: 16,755
A Closer Look At The Red Sox And The Luxury Tax
The Red Sox’ bullpen — or, really, its lack of fortification this offseason — has garnered plenty of recent attention. President of baseball operations Dave Dombrowski has not only downplayed the possibility of a reunion with Craig Kimbrel but also the addition of any notable arm. While Dombrowski has stated that there’s no mandate to remain south of the top luxury tax border, it also seems increasingly likely (if not apparent) that that’s exactly what the team is planning to do. Most onlookers have at least a cursory awareness of what that entails, but I felt it worth a deeper look to see exactly what the Sox are deeming the theoretical breaking point — if they are indeed set on avoiding that barrier.
This isn’t necessarily a call for the Red Sox to spend more, to be clear. Boston is poised to carry Major League Baseball’s highest payroll for the second consecutive season and stomached the hit when they incurred top-level luxury penalization last year. This offseason, ownership green-lit a $68MM expenditure on Nathan Eovaldi and another $6.25MM on Steve Pearce. The Sox have hardly refused to spend. Every team, though, has its limit, and at the very least Boston seems close to that point.
At present, Roster Resource’s Jason Martinez has the Red Sox with a 2019 payroll of $238,373,928. That’s how much money they’ll pay out to players — those on the roster and those either no longer on the 40-man (Rusney Castillo) or no longer even in the organization (Pablo Sandoval).
For the purposes of the luxury tax (labeled as the Competitive Balance Tax in baseball’s collective bargaining agreement), however, payroll is calculated by the average annual value of the contracts for which a team is responsible (in addition to a set level of player benefit costs, which include medical costs, moving/travel expenses, etc.). Jason has Boston’s luxury tax payroll (“actual” payroll, as termed in the CBA) projected at $241,269,197. Those numbers, both the 2019 payroll and the “actual” payroll, are estimates and aren’t exact, but they’re both close approximations that provide a reasonably accurate depiction of what the organization’s expenses currently entail. Before delving further into what additional spending would mean for the Red Sox, it’s important to note what those numbers mean for the team’s current taxation penalties.
For the 2019 season, the luxury tax line has been set at $206MM. Even without re-signing Eovaldi and Pearce, the Sox were always going to be well north of that line. The collective bargaining agreement stipulates that a second-time offender — the Red Sox were over the luxury line in 2018 but stayed shy of it in 2017 — will pay a 30 percent tax on the first $20MM over the initial luxury line. Teams are subject to an additional 12 percent tax on the next $20MM spent. If a team crosses the luxury limit by more than $40MM, it will pay an additional 45 percent tax from that point forward and also see its top pick in the next year’s draft dropped by 10 spots. Put otherwise:
- $206MM to $226MM: 30 percent tax (a total of $6MM)
- $226MM to $246MM: 42 percent tax (a total of $8.4MM)
- $246M or more: 75 percent tax and a loss of 10 spots in the following year’s draft
Using Jason’s figures above, the Red Sox are paying the full $6MM of that first level and are $15,269,197 into the second level of tax penalization. That sum is taxed at a 42 percent rate, meaning the Sox are paying a $6,413,063 tax on it. At present, then, the Red Sox are committed to paying about $12.413MM worth of luxury tax penalties. There’s a $4,730,803 gap between their current projection and the $246MM top luxury line. If they were to, theoretically, add another reliever for a dollar less in order to avoid top-level penalization, the Red Sox would be taxed an additional $1,986,937. Of course, that’d leave them unable to make a single in-season addition should the need arise.
That, however, is the gripe for many critics. A bullpen headlined by Matt Barnes, Ryan Brasier, Heath Hembree, Brandon Workman, Tyler Thornburg and Brian Johnson seems quite likely to necessitate trade-deadline augmentation — and that’s before even allowing for the possibility of an injury to a key player that would also require a trade acquisition. It’s not only possible that the Red Sox will have crossed the top luxury line by the time the July 31 non-waiver trade deadline has passed — it seems downright likely. Perhaps the plan is to find trade acquisitions whose salaries can be largely paid down by their current team, but doing so would require paying up a greater premium in terms of prospects and thus weaken an already thin farm system.
Should paying more in terms of prospects be preferable to lessening the 2020 draft budget? Some might argue that it’s preferable to go ahead and commit to taking the draft hit in order to gain the advantages of a bolstered bullpen from the start of the season. After all, the division is hardly a shoo-in and the Sox obviously have designs at chasing an elusive repeat title. But what does that actually mean from a financial standpoint?
For the sake of argument, let’s take a look at what the Red Sox would have to pay in order to sign Kimbrel at the four-year, $70MM term projected by MLBTR in our Top 50 Free Agent Predictions back in November. In trying to peg Kimbrel’s eventual contract, Tim Dierkes, Jeff Todd and I all felt that Kimbrel would seek to top Aroldis Chapman‘s record guarantee (which he reportedly has indeed pursued) but ultimately fall shy and instead, ahem, “settle” for breaking Wade Davis‘ $17.33MM annual salary record for a reliever over a four-year term. Kimbrel may very well fall shy of our $70MM prediction, but he could still set a new AAV standard with a three-year, $52.5MM deal. Even a one-year deal at the $17.5MM level would come with the same CBT hit for 2019. For purposes of this hypothetical, that seems a reasonable figure to work with.
If the Sox were to pay Kimbrel a $17.5MM annual salary, the first $4,703,803 of that salary would close the gap between Boston’s current “actual” payroll and the $246MM threshold. As noted above, that’d come with a $1,986,937 luxury hit, coming to a total of $6,690,740. The remaining $12,769,197 would come with a hefty tax of $9,576,898. That’s a total of $11.564MM just in taxes before considering the money the team would actually owe to Kimbrel himself.
Viewed through that lens, Boston would effectively be on the hook for a stunning $29,036,835 in 2019 if they were to sign Kimbrel at the record rate he’s quite likely eyeing. (A multi-year deal, of course, might have greater or lesser salaries in its various seasons, though that’s all averaged for the CBT.) Frankly, even beyond any concerns about lengthy commitment to a not-so-youthful reliever, it’s pretty clear to see why the Sox don’t have much interest in retaining Kimbrel unless his price tag craters (at which point a plethora of other teams would join the bidding). Though the total luxury tax bill would still not make up an enormous amount of the team’s total payroll-related spending, it would perhaps turn a Kimbrel signing from a hefty investment to an eye-popping splurge.
That math is also informative when examining why the Sox have passed over other top-end relievers. For instance, beating the Yankees’ three-year, $27MM offer to Adam Ottavino by a margin of $500K annually would’ve still been costly for Boston. As with any contract, the first $4,703,803 of the deal would’ve been taxed at $1,986,937. The remaining $4,796,197 would come with a $3,597,148. In total, signing Ottavino at a $9.5MM annual salary would effectively cost $15.084MM in 2019.
Boiled down, any relief addition for the Red Sox with an annual salary north of the $4,703,803 gap that exists between their current “actual” payroll and the $246MM luxury line could be viewed as such (where X = the average annual value of a new contract):
(X – 4,703,803) + (X – 4,703,803)*0.75 + 6,690,740 = Total 2019 expenditure
All of that, of course, is before even acknowledging the 10-spot drop they’d face in the draft for a second consecutive season. There’s no way of knowing precisely how much the Sox would be costing themselves in the 2020 draft, or even how much they stand to lose in the 2019 draft after crossing the top level last year, as 2019 slot values aren’t yet known. However, dropping from No. 30 in 2018 to No. 40 (the drop they’re facing this year) would have resulted in a loss of $489,500 in the team’s draft pool. Draft slot values increase incrementally each season, and the Red Sox’ exact placement in the draft order obviously can’t be known. But generally speaking, the Sox would be looking at a 10-spot drop and a loss of at least $500K in their 2020 draft pool.
Clearly, the price to add a reliever of any significance will be steep for Boston — possibly more so than most would expect before truly diving into the math behind further additions. That said, it’s still worth questioning the Red Sox’ decision to draw a line in the sand at this juncture. The current state of the ‘pen makes it seem likely that Boston will need to add a reliever during the season anyhow, and that could still put the team over the limit while also costing prospects.
Beyond that, this it’s quite likely that this is the last time Boston will ever enjoy the Chris Sale, Xander Bogaerts and J.D. Martinez all on the same roster. Sale and Bogaerts are free agents after the 2019 season, and Martinez has an opt-out provision that he’ll presumably exercise if he produces anywhere near his 2018 levels. Add in the fact that Mookie Betts can become a free agent after the 2020 season — though the Sox surely hope to extend their franchise player — and there’s all the more urgency for Boston to go all out in its pursuit of another championship.
Further spending truly doesn’t appear to be in the cards for Boston, though perhaps they’ll be able to secure one of the market’s remaining relievers at a modest $2-3MM commitment that’d still allow them to avoid the top line. But the Sox look like they’re genuinely poised to enter the season with a glaring weakness — one that’ll be tough to account for during the season. While the staggering level of taxation they’d have had to pay on another notable ‘pen arm (or two) makes their reluctance understandable, that’ll still be a tough sell to fans if the current group of relievers doesn’t exceed expectations in dramatic fashion. It’s an illustration of the potency of the current luxury tax rules — though, of course, the payrolls of virtually every other team in baseball presently reside comfortably out of range of this level of penalties.
Extension Candidate: Kyle Freeland
Pitchers and catchers report to Spring Training in about two weeks. Along with the relaxed vibes of baseball’s preseason comes long-term contract discussions for young players. One standout from the 2018 season who could look to make a deal is Rockies lefty Kyle Freeland.
Freeland, 26 in May, was drafted eighth overall by the Rockies in 2014. He reached the Majors in 2017, posting a solid rookie campaign with a 4.10 ERA in 156 innings. That earned him a seventh place finish in the NL Rookie of the Year voting. Freeland’s peripheral stats were unimpressive, but you can’t argue with results – especially for a pitcher who calls Coors Field home.
Then, in 2018, Freeland took his game to the next level. He posted a 2.85 ERA in 202 1/3 innings, ranking fifth among qualified NL starters. That was good for a fourth place Cy Young finish. Again, Freeland’s strikeout, walk, and groundball rates were nothing to write home about, but he was able to succeed by avoiding the middle of the plate and generating soft contact, as explained by Jeff Sullivan of FanGraphs. Sullivan cautiously drew a Tom Glavine comp, and wrote, “It’s not the most comfortable skillset to bank on, but, honestly, after looking at Freeland with a microscope, I have become a believer in his ability to move the ball around.”
I imagine the Rockies believe in Freeland more than anyone than perhaps his mom – they drafted and developed him, and they just watched him pitch perhaps the best season in franchise history. So it would make sense for Rockies Executive Vice President & General Manager Jeff Bridich to look to broker a deal. Bridich became the Rockies’ senior director of baseball operations in 2006, so he’s had a hand in approximately 20 multiyear extensions the franchise has done since then. Bridich likely intersected with Freeland’s agency, MSM Sports, on Jamey Carroll‘s 2007 deal. MSM has also done extensions for Josh Harrison and Brandon Webb over the years.
So let’s talk numbers. Freeland has exactly 2.000 years of Major League service, so credit the Rockies for not manipulating his service time back when he cracked the team’s rotation out of Spring Training in 2017. There is a very clear template for contract extensions for starting pitchers with 2+ years of Major League service who fell short of Super Two eligibility. The framework of a five-year, $30MM deal originated with Jon Lester‘s contract with the Red Sox in March 2009. Yovani Gallardo signed a similar deal with the Brewers a year later, and then they became commonplace for the next couple of years. However, the trend has died off, with only Corey Kluber‘s April 2015 deal existing as a somewhat recent example.
Kluber’s contract does not fit the mold – at $38.5MM, it was the largest of the bunch. That’s with good reason, as Kluber’s career and platform year numbers dwarfed the others, and he was coming off a Cy Young award. He mostly seems relevant here as a clear ceiling for Freeland. Aside from the many comparable 2+ pitchers like Lester, Trevor Cahill, and Clay Buchholz, we can also throw a couple of 1+ pitchers into the mix in Julio Teheran and Madison Bumgarner. Bumgarner received a $35MM deal in April 2012 with just one year and 127 days of service time under his belt, scoring a contract bigger than those in the 2+ class. Teheran’s deal in February 2014 is also worth mentioning, as he simply didn’t have the stats of those who came before him (like innings and wins) yet landed a $32.4MM guarantee. That’s just $100K less than Chris Sale, who signed a year earlier with superior stats across the board. Teheran’s deal was thought to be a new benchmark at the time, but I think it raised expectations for young pitchers and their agents, mostly preventing subsequent extensions.
Freeland compares favorably to guys like Cahill and Buchholz, who signed very similar $30MM deals that bought out one year of free agency and included club options on two more. Plus, those contracts are eight years old. It’s possible Aaron Nola and Luis Severino can raise the bar for what successful starting pitchers (who nonetheless lack a Cy Young award) can earn their first time through arbitration if they win their hearings in February. Plus, a good case can be made that Freeland should beat Bumgarner’s $35MM contract, as Freeland had the better platform year and pitches at Coors Field.
In my opinion, a fair deal for Freeland would be for five years and $35-37MM. It would cover his final pre-arbitration season (2019), all three arbitration years, and one year of free agency, taking the deal through 2023. One perk MSM Sports could fight for would be one club option instead of two. Of the ten comparable deals I looked at, seven of them included two club options. And two of the deals that only had one were the initial contracts in this mold, for Lester and Gallardo. Beginning with Buchholz’s deal in April 2011, every pitcher accepted two club options with the exception of Teheran. The Rockies will likely label Teheran an outlier, but we haven’t seen the Lester Contract type deal in the last five years. A contract for Freeland would re-establish a precedent in case 2+ pitchers like Jose Berrios, Mike Clevinger, German Marquez, Blake Snell, Jameson Taillon, and Trevor Williams seek financial security.
MLBTR Chat Transcript: Harper, Machado, Yankees
Click here to read a transcript of today’s chat with Tim Dierkes.
Making Sense Of The Whit Merrifield Extension
It’s difficult sometimes to make sense of the extensions we hear about. Why is it that player A is earning so much more or less than player B? Sometimes it’s obvious; sometimes it’s not. In some cases, there are relatively unique, personal circumstances that help explain it — some of which may not even really become known publicly. In every case, the actual course of negotiations requires both sides to estimate market value at a point at which there are necessarily still key factors that are unknown. There’s plenty of variability based upon varying motivations of the particular team and player involved. Still, we like to think that market value underpins baseball contracts. Every deal is susceptible of examination from a value perspective.
Given all of that, it seems worth taking a closer look at the recently reported deal between the Royals and second baseman/center fielder Whit Merrifield. Despite two-straight All-Star seasons and an upward trajectory in his performance, he’s promised just $16.25MM over four years — less than the qualifying offer rate ($17.9MM) for a single season. He can boost that by a bit via escalators, but will also give away an option year at a $10.5MM salary. Even in the extension context, it seems like a bargain for a high-quality player who has immense versatility and a well-rounded skillset. So, how to make sense of this?
It all starts with his experience and age. Merrifield is still shy of three years of MLB service yet just recently hit his 30th birthday. Since he didn’t have enough service time to reach arbitration early as a Super Two qualifier, he was still a full season away from commanding more than the league minimum salary, with the inherent risks and limitations of the arb process to look forward to thereafter. Moreover, the recent trends in the aging curve have not been kind to elder statesmen.
Add to that the fact that Merrifield’s most notable skills — hitting for average, speed on the bases, and good and versatile glovework — are not particularly well-compensated in the arbitration process. To be sure, they do show up indirectly in earnings since the process pays players who see a lot of playing time. But power stats (homers and ribbies) have tended to pay best over time than the harder-to-quantify areas of the game. Even stolen bases, the counting stat in which Merrifield shines, aren’t considered major drivers.
Whatever one thinks of Merrifield’s particular outlook, in terms of skills and health, the overall situation was one in which his anticipated future earnings were rather limited. In arbitration, barring a huge power burst, he’d have profiled as a strong but hardly record-shattering player. And his hypothetical free agency was laden with risk. How might he look as a player four years in the future? Nobody knows, but odds are he won’t be quite in his prime, since his pre-existing arbitration control extended through his age-33 season.
Let’s dig into the numbers to see why this is the case.
First, looking at the forthcoming arb years, we can check in on some second basemen and other comps to learn about what Merrifield might have taken home had he elected to go year to year. As I’ve noted previously, DJ LeMahieu represents an interesting overall comp since he just wrapped up his own arbitration run. After starting with a $3.0MM salary, and posting one big offensive season during his arb years, he finished with a $16.3MM total — a near-exact (and perhaps not coincidental) match for what Merrifield will receive.
When I first proposed that comp last March, Merrifield had yet to post his excellent 2018 season. As things stand, it’s not hard to see a path to more than $16.25MM. Just how high Merrifield could have climbed would obviously have been dependent upon what he does in the season to come, but we can guess at some parameters.
In terms of starting point, Merrifield ought to end up with a case for much greater earning power than LeMahieu (.284/.329/.370, 15 home runs, 157 RBI, 1,901 plate appearances) and Joe Panik (.282/.345/.408, 29 home runs, 170 RBI, 1,818 plate appearances), who earned $3.45MM in his first arb year. The Dodgers’ Chris Taylor rode a breakout 2017 and solid 2018 follow-up to a first-year arb salary of $3.5MM. He’s sitting on 39 home runs and 152 RBI with a .262/.331/.435 batting line through 1490 plate appearances. Even if Merrifield isn’t able to push or top twenty long balls in 2019, he’d surely be on track to carry a much more impressive overall statistical baseline than Taylor. He already has more plate appearances (1,669) and RBI (167) and nearly as many long balls (33), with a full season left to improve upon those tallies.
On the other hand, it’s tough to foresee anything like the 34-dinger outburst and second-place MVP finish that allowed Javier Baez to achieve a $5.2MM first-year arb salary. In all likelihood, depending upon how things play out in 2018, Merrifield likely would have commanded an arb-1 salary somewhere between the numbers we’ve thrown out for consideration — say, in the realm of $3.75MM to $4.75MM.
A few other mid-arb players also help illustrate how things could have proceeded in the event that Merrifield would have kept producing throughout his arb years, quite apart from the starting point. Shortstop Marcus Semien entered arb with sixty home runs and near-average total productivity through just under two thousand plate appearances. He earned $3.125MM in his first year after an injury-limited platform season and bumped up to $5.9MM in 2019 salary after launching 15 long balls in 703 plate appearances. Scooter Gennett jumped from a $2.525MM starting point to $5.7MM and $9.775MM salaries, driven by a total of fifty dingers and robust overall productivity in his final two platform campaigns.
With good fortune and some continued improvement, Merrifield could have tracked those or even greater raises. In the best-case, reasonably realistic scenario — fully healthy seasons at the top of his prior power levels (~20 home runs annually) — he might have started at a $4.5MM level and taken home successive $3.5MM raises. That would have resulted in $24MM of total arbitration salary.
Of course, it’s imaginable that Merrifield’s performance, and/or intervening health issues, could deflect him from that sort of path. Joe Panik had set the stage for bigger earnings than that (despite suffering a major ballpark-related disadvantage vis-a-vis LeMahieu), but stumbled after taking down $3.45MM in his arb1 season. He settled for just $3.8MM for the coming campaign and has no hope of approaching LeMahieu’s overall earning level.
Obviously, any kind of significant injury would sap any player’s ability to command a raise. Since Merrifield is not even in arbitration yet, an ill-timed and significant injury (say, in camp this spring) could have been extremely damaging to his earning power. Even if things went well for a time, Merrifield would always have been vulnerable to injuries or downturns in performance. That’s the same for any player, but the risks were amplified (and the future free agent benefits diminished) by his age.
It bears emphasis that the risks still apply before Merrifield would reach arbitration, since he’s still a full season away. Don’t believe me about the variance in arb earnings? Here’s an illustration, using some big names. Francisco Lindor nearly set a first-year-eligible record when he agreed to a $10.55MM contract earlier this month. He has been healthier and more productive of late than the fellow star shortstop of the same service class to whom he’s often compared — Carlos Correa, who edged Lindor in the 2015 Rookie of the Year vote. The Astros star’s salary remains unresolved, but will fall between $4.25MM and $5MM. Despite piling up plate appearances at the outset of his career, Correa is now over five hundred shy of Lindor due to some injuries. Unsurprisingly, he has also fallen behind his contemporary in home runs and holds only a slight edge in runs batted in. Correa still holds a clear edge in overall, park-adjusted offensive productivity (128 wRC+ vs. 120 wRC+), and is still considered an elite talent, but took a down year at the wrong time. Lindor’s playing time and power ramped up in his platform years, allowing him to more than double Correa’s first-year arb earning power.
If $24MM of arbitration earnings represented a best-case scenario, then the downside was more or less unlimited. Obviously, it’s hard to imagine that Merrifield would be cut out of significant future earnings entirely, barring a truly catastrophic injury. But he’s still a full season away. And as Panik shows, it’s not hard to craft a scenario where the earnings come in well short of their anticipated trajectory. The risks are clear.
If there’s something potentially objectionable about this arrangement from Merrifield’s perspective, perhaps it’s the fact that he coughed up a free agent season. That’s where the Royals could find some real upside, since they’ll have a chance to hang onto Merrifield for only a one-year commitment, when he could in theory be in position to take down quite a bit more in free agency.
That said, just what kind of open-market earning scenarios is Merrifield really sacrificing (or, at least pushing back by one year)? It seems rather unlikely, even from four years out, that he’ll enter the 2023 season thinking he left an enormous amount of money on the table.
Take this comparison. We can all agree that Merrifield has had an outstanding pair of seasons. He’s sitting on a .296/.347/.449 cumulative slash with 31 home runs and 79 steals, with his other contributions leading to a cumulative valuation of 9.3 rWAR / 8.1 fWAR. Compare that to Jed Lowrie, who once had his own breakout season at 29 years of age. He was injured in the interim but turned things on more recently. Lowrie just hit the open market at a slightly more advanced age than Merrifield would have, sporting a two-year platform of .272/.356/.448 hitting with 37 home runs and 8.8 rWAR / 8.5 fWAR.
Lowrie’s free agent take? Two years and $20MM. That salary level is reflected in the one option year that Merrifield gave the team in his new deal, which is valued at $10.5MM — again, as with the LeMahieu arb comp, perhaps not coincidentally.
Even in a highly optimistic scenario, such as the Ben Zobrist bidding war, there’s a limit to what this sort of player can earn in free agency. Zobrist was a hot commodity entering his age-35 season, having a long track record of excellent offensive production (well outstripping Merrifield’s overall record to this point) and defensive versatility. He secured a four-year, $56MM contract.
All things considered, this seems to be rather a fair arrangement for both sides. It’s a deal that lets the team avoid a runaway arbitration salary, and perhaps gain another season of a respected veteran at a bit of a discount rate. But it’s hardly the Jose Ramirez contract — another deal involving a two-plus service class infielder who was coming off of a breakout campaign. Ramirez, of course, was just 24 years of age and was just beginning an ascendancy that has continued to levels that were perhaps not anticipated at the time. His deal conveyed a pair of valuable team options — for his age-30 and 31 seasons. The sort of upside present there just isn’t available in the Merrifield contract.
For a 30-year-old, non-slugging infielder/outfielder who is still less than three campaigns into his MLB career, this extension lands in a sensible realm in terms of both length and total guarantee. Upon sifting through some other recent contracts, it’s not hard to see how the sides landed where they did.