MLBTR Polls

We often hear talk of which team “won” a trade, despite the fact that most deals are driven at least as much by organizational need as they are asset valuation. Truthfully, assessing a swap from that perspective alone is rarely sufficient and often misleading. That being said, it can be an interesting exercise to focus purely on value, especially when a deal involves long-term assets on both sides.

That’s the way this poll will approach the recent trade between the Braves and Angels. Let’s break down the contractual assets that changed hands:

Angels Receive

• Andrelton Simmons, 26, SS — Controlled for five years with $53MM guaranteed. Arguably the game’s best defensive player, Simmons has historically been merely an average hitter for his position. He has shown some power (17 home runs in 2013), though, arguably making him a high-floor player with upside.
• Jose Briceno, 23, C — The backstop, seemingly a minor part of the deal, has yet to advance into the upper minors and struggled last year at the High-A level.

Braves Receive

• Sean Newcomb, 22, LHP — Rising prospect with 6+ years of control available who pitched at Double-A level last year. The power southpaw has significant upside but has battled control issues.
• Chris Ellis, 23, RHP — Fast-moving college arm who could contribute at the back of a rotation. He also reached Double-A in 2015 and can be controlled for 6+ seasons in majors.
• Erick Aybar, 31, SS — Entering his final year of control at a $8.5MM salary, Aybar could be an underappreciated part of this deal. He’s a quality veteran infielder coming off of a down year, but with a history of sturdy defense, good speed, and an above-average bat for a shortstop. He could also become a trade chip this winter or at the trade deadline.
• $2.5MM (representing difference between 2016 salaries of Simmons and Aybar)

Both organizations have new general managers who went out on a limb, in different ways, to strike this deal. And both talked about the value proposition that they faced (in addition to considerations of organizational need).

Angels GM Billy Eppler has many roster holes to fill, and could easily have relied on Aybar, but explained that the trade presented a rare chance to add a top-quality defender at the game’s most important position in the field. “When you have an opportunity, you do it,” he said. “The free agent market does not generally offer a plentiful amount of shortstops. It was a supply-and-demand equation.” Only that kind of premium ability could justify giving up Newcomb’s huge arm, per Eppler, who said that doing so “gives you a lot of pause and makes your stomach hurt a little bit.”

For Braves GM John Coppolella, meanwhile, there were also references to the need to seize an opportunity to acquire hard-to-get assets at an appealing price. “It’s a very tough trade, and a painful trade for us,” he said. “We didn’t want to trade Andrelton Simmons. But we felt this was too good for us to pass up. We felt like we were getting so much talent back in this deal, that if we didn’t make this trade, it would be very tough for us to keep going forward with our plans.” He went on to discuss the importance of Aybar to the swap, noting that the deal was not “some kind of prospect trade,” but rather “was a value-for-value trade that had two really good prospects in it.”

So, both general managers felt so torn about the deal that their comments referenced pain (physical or otherwise). Yet both also saw a value proposition that was simply too good to pass up. The Halos pulled the trigger even though they already had a good shortstop in place for 2016 and will have rotation openings thereafter. And the rebuilding Braves made the deal despite Simmons’ youth and control, not to mention the fact that they have already built a stable of young pitching through other trades.

We’ll have to wait to see how things play out, of course, but it’s still fun to ask: if you were forced to take one side of this deal, from a pure value perspective (i.e., ignoring team-specific context), which one would you take?

Let’s be honest: this is not a question we expected to be asking at the start of the year, when Marco Estrada was settling into the Blue Jays pen as a swingman and long reliever. But he impressed early, provided a solid rotation presence much of the way, and had a notable impact in the post-season. That makes it worthwhile to wonder: is a qualifying offer in play?

We already know something about Estrada’s market valuation, because the Jays acquired him early last fall from the Brewers. The swap sent first baseman Adam Lind to Milwaukee. He, too, had a nice season after the deal, but at the time it wasn’t the most impactful deal. If anything, that trade suggested that Lind was the more valuable player, since he was the more expensive side of the 1-to-1 trade. Lind cost $7.5MM last year, plus a $500K buyout on a $8MM option that wasn’t certain to be exercised (but now likely will be). Estrada, meanwhile, ultimately agreed to a $3.9MM salary to avoid arbitration.

Nothing about that trade suggested that Estrada would be valued at anything close to the qualifying offer rate. Wwhen he came to Toronto, he was coming off of a four-year run in which he compiled 509 2/3 innings of 3.99 ERA pitching, with 8.4 K/9 against 2.3 BB/9. But that K rate had been in decline, and 2013 was his worst season in the earned run department.How have things changed since? MLBTR’s Mark Polishuk took a closer look in September, but in a nutshell, it’s hard to argue with Estrada’s 2015 results: he logged a 3.13 ERA over 181 frames. But his strikeouts plummeted to 6.5 per nine, while his walks ranged above his career average to 2.7 BB/9. And ERA estimators were not pleased with the new mix of peripherals: Estrada earned a 4.40 FIP, 4.93 xFIP, and 4.64 SIERA.

It’s worth noting, also, that Estrada enjoyed a .216 batting average on balls in play against him. He’s always controlled contact, as Tony Blengino of Fangraphs has explained, but that’s still a notably low mark. He has a notably excellent change, and doesn’t rely on velocity, so you might like his chances going forward. But Estrada has already turned 32 years of age, so that’s not on his side, either.

Then again, the post-season provided Estrada an opportunity to put his abilities on display before the entire league, and he didn’t disappoint. In 19 1/3 innings over three starts, he allowed just five earned runs while striking out 15 and issuing only one walk.

All said, there’s reason for some skepticism, but also reason to believe that some team will make Estrade a three-year offer at a healthy AAV. And given that possibility, he might be inclined to test the market for what will likely be his best chance at a multi-year deal. Meanwhile, a pitching-needy Toronto club might feel okay about taking the risk that Estrada will accept a $15.8MM, one-year qualifying offer. That wouldn’t exactly be crippling for a large-budget contender, even if he’s only a solid back-of-the-rotation piece.

It’ll be fascinating to see what happens with Estrada. For now, let’s see what MLBTR’s readers think: should the Jays make him a qualifying offer?

The NLCS matchup between the Cubs and Mets fell flat, as New York steamrolled their fellow upstarts. Chicago, though, did just fine in the clubs’ regular season tilts (they swept New York in seven games) and had the better regular season record (by exactly those seven wins). While the Mets are focused now on the World Series, it’s back to the future all over again for the Cubbies.

It’s hardly novel to observe that these two clubs are both loaded with young, somewhat opposed talent bases, with the Cubs having more on the position player side and the Mets carrying a better stable of pitching. Quite apart from the head-to-head results, then, it seems interesting to consider which organization has the better outlook after both put up huge seasons.

Each club has some significant players who’ll be controlled for two more seasons, barring extensions — Jake Arrieta and Lucas Duda come to mind — as well as some notable near-MLB prospects — such as Billy McKinney and Brandon Nimmo. But perhaps the most telling comparison, for near and long-term outlook, is of the players who have already reached the majors and are under control for three or more seasons beyond 2015. Here’s a list of some notable names to consider:

Cubs: Jon Lester, Starlin Castro, Anthony Rizzo, Jorge Soler, Hector Rondon, Javier Baez, Kris Bryant, Carl Edwards, Addison Russell, Kyle Schwarber, Arismendy Alcantara

Mets: David Wright, Matt Harvey, Zack Wheeler, Jacob deGrom, Travis d’Arnaud, Jeurys Familia, Wilmer Flores, Noah Syndergaard, Steven Matz, Dilson Herrera, Michael Conforto

So, which organizational arrangement would you prefer moving forward?

Entering the season, Ian Desmond carried the reputation of being one of the game’s top all-around shortstops. From 2012-14, he averaged 23 homers and 22 steals per season, hitting .275/.326/.462 and playing passable, if unspectacular defense along the way. Depending on your defensive metrics of choice (DRS considered him below average, while UZR said slightly above average), Desmond was consistently worth about 3.5 to 4.5 wins per season. That kind of track record and the fact that he didn’t turn 30 until this summer made a $100MM+ commitment on the free agent market seem likely. (Desmond had, in fact, already turned down an offer in excess of $100MM from the Nationals, though it was said to come with a large amount of deferred money.)

The first three and a half months of the season, though, could scarcely have been worse. Desmond struggled in the field immensely and even more so at the plate. On July 19, his season batting line bottomed out at an unthinkable and uncharacteristic .204/.248/.324. While that cutoff is admittedly very arbitrary, his production following that date more or less mirrored his excellent numbers from 2012-14; Desmond hit .272/.343/.464 with 12 homers and eight steals over his final 68 contests. Unfortunately for him, his overall season line wasn’t salvageable. He finished his walk year at .233/.290/.384.

The question now facing Desmond is what that ugly three-and-a-half-month run did to his free agent stock. Disastrous first half aside, his strong finish probably did restore some value in the eyes of interested parties, and there’s little else available on the shortstop market. Asdrubal Cabrera is coming off a nice season, but teams have long been wary of his defense and some may view him as a second baseman. Other options such as Jimmy Rollins, Alexei Ramirez and Stephen Drew had equally, if not more disappointing seasons.

While some will suggest that Desmond accept a qualifying offer (if it’s made) or sign a one-year deal to rebuild value, few players want to go the one-year route, and it’d be surprising to see the lone prominent shortstop on the market not end up with a rather sizable multi-year deal. But let’s see what MLBTR readers think.

For this exercise, we’ll focus on the number of guaranteed years, rather than the average annual value of those seasons. Which scenario do you see as most likely?

Heading into the year, it looked like the Nationals would have four fairly obvious qualifying offer recipients: Jordan Zimmermann, Ian Desmond, Doug Fister, and Denard Span. It’s reflective of the team’s overall struggles that only the first of these is a complete slam dunk to receive one now. Despite his forgettable year, Desmond still seems fully worthy as well. But it’s hard to see Fister getting the offer, as $15.8MM for one year probably outstrips his current value on the market.

So what about Span? The center fielder delivered exactly what the Nationals hoped for when they shipped out Alex Meyer to acquire him from the Twins before the 2013 season. He was solid in his first season in D.C. and excellent in 2014, when he slashed .302/.355/.416 and swiped 31 bags over 668 plate appearances. Defensive metrics soured on him somewhat in the second of those campaigns, but he provided outstanding value on his reasonably-priced contract.

This year was more of the same — .301/.365/.431 — but with one glaring exception: Span made only 275 trips to the batter’s box. He recovered quickly enough from offseason sports hernia surgery, missing only about two weeks to start the year. But back and abdominal issues cropped up in the middle of the year, giving way to hip problems, and a late comeback bid proved fleeting. The 31-year-old underwent a hip procedure, ending his season.

The first issue, then, is simply one of health. It’s unclear exactly what kind of recovery timeline should be expected, though certainly we’ve heard no indication that he won’t be ready for the spring. And Span himself recently tweeted that his recovery is progressing well. Regardless of the immediate prognosis, though, there’s some legitimate concern here. The fact that Span struggled with concussions earlier in his career does not help the situation.

While questions about Span’s ability to stay on the field in 2016 do limit his immediate value, though, the bulk of that concern lies in his long-term outlook for teams weighing a multi-year deal. A qualifying offer, of course, only represents a one-year commitment (if accepted), which limits the risk.

True, Span’s health will impact the market assessment that he and his representatives would make in weighing a qualifying offer — i.e., if they don’t foresee an attractive multi-year deal, the QO becomes more attractive. But so long as he remains on track for a more-or-less full 2016 season, Span still seems like an excellent candidate to land a rather high-dollar, multi-year deal in free agency. He and Dexter Fowler arguably represent the only everyday regular center fielders on the market, with Colby Rasmus and Austin Jackson making up their competition.

There’s an argument to be made, then, that the Nats have little risk in extending the QO. There’s no reason not to pick up a draft pick if he’s destined to decline. And we’ve yet to see a single player accept one — even the aging Michael Cuddyer, who declined his offer last year from the Rockies despite coming off of a similarly injury-plagued season. Even if Span did take the $15.8MM, moreover, that might not be a bad result for Washington. Jayson Werth struggled with injuries of his own last year, and Michael Taylor — the presumptive replacement in center — showed both promise and a proclivity to strike out. Both hit from the right side, unlike Span. A left-handed outfielder capable of playing center is a clear target for the Nats, and keeping Span on a one-year commitment (even at that rate) would meet that need and then some. Bringing Taylor on slowly, holding down his arbitration earning power, and limiting the wear and tear on Werth would be nice side benefits.

Of course, there’s a counter-argument to be made here, too. The Nationals have had their share of injury issues over the last several years, and have not always managed to cope when key players went down. And some might disagree that Span would likely turn down the offer; there’s little chance he’ll reach that guarantee over multiple years, and it’s hard to predict how his market would play out — especially if he’s saddled with draft compensation. Is it too great a risk to the club to dangle that much money to an arguably injury-prone player?

Let’s put this one to an up-or-down vote:

Option decisions are among the first important moves made by teams in the offseason. While many are fairly easy to call, there are plenty of borderline examples.

The White Sox face a tough decision regarding veteran shortstop Alexei Ramirez. Chicago can choose either to employ Ramirez for $10MM next year, or instead pay him a $1MM buyout and allow him to hit the free agent market. In other words, it will cost the team $9MM if it wants another year of Ramirez.

Looking just at last year, this is not a difficult decision for GM Rick Hahn. Ramirez slashed just .249/.285/.357, put up his worst-ever running mark (a rather stunning -5.0 BsR), and was viewed as a sub-par defender by both UZR (-6.4) and DRS (-6). Things ticked up in the second half, but the overall output wasn’t pretty.

Then again, Ramirez has for the most part been a model of consistency over his eight years with the club. He has made 4,999 plate appearances and played an average of 153 games per season over 2008-2015, providing a stabilizing roster presence. Ramirez hasn’t generally been spectacular, but has been an average or better overall regular in most of those seasons.

The 2014 season, in fact, was one of Ramirez’s best. While his defensive metrics dropped, he still rated well there in terms of UZR and continued to generate good ratings on the basepaths. And the light-hitting infielder posted his second-best career batting line, an unexciting but useful .273/.305/.408.

Even if you value the track record, Ramirez is 34 years old and was never an outstanding player. Reasonable-but-optimistic expectations would be for roughly league-average performance in 2016. There was a time where that kind of outlook would make this an easy buyout situation. But ten million bucks doesn’t buy what it used to in the game of baseball.

Ramirez wouldn’t top any teams’ priority lists if he hits free agency, but he’d still get paid. That’s due in large part to the lack of supply on the shortstop market. After Ian Desmond and Asdrubal Cabrera, clubs looking for a plug-and-play veteran will be choosing between Ramirez and Jimmy Rollins, who had every bit as rough a season and is even older.

As MLBTR’s Tim Dierkes writes in his preview of the White Sox’ offseason, the $9MM that Chicago would need to commit to Ramirez is perhaps “only slightly above” his value in free agency. There are some teams that would love to have a potentially average performer to replace sub-par platoons, while others might want a veteran to help ease the transition of younger, long-term options. To an extent, the White Sox look to fit both situations: the idea of a year with Tyler Saladino isn’t too appealing for a club that hopes to win, but clogging the position wouldn’t maximize the value of top prospect Tim Anderson.

All said, the salary is probably close enough to market that the White Sox should pay it if they want Ramirez back. If nothing else, it may be tough to re-sign him after cutting ties, and the risk is limited on a one-year commitment.

The other options for finding production at shortstop are limited. But there are alternatives, and bringing back the incumbent could represent a slight overpay with a fairly low ceiling.

So, we’ll put it to a vote (app users click here):