MLBTR Polls

We rarely hear such dramatically opposing takes on players as Jason Heyward has drawn in free agency. His reported signing today — for eight years & $184MM with the Cubs — only ratcheted things up another level.

It’s long been expected that Heyward would command this level of contract. MLBTR’s Tim Dierkes predicted ten years and $200MM. I guessed the same (and profiled Heyward’s free agent case, if you are interested in reading more). And we certainly weren’t out on a limb.

As I noted earlier tonight, Heyward’s deal, which critically includes opt-out rights after both three and four years, is arguably a more valuable compensation package than the $200MM pacts we posited. Regardless whether you think the other offers available were preferable, we can all agree that he was paid like a superstar.

There’s little sense in re-hashing all the arguments for and against Heyward here. The above links contain plenty of information in that regard, and most of our readers have probably already made up their minds.

So, time to make it official: does the MLBTR readership view Heyward as a prime-aged, prime-performing asset or a low-power hitter who just isn’t worth this kind of a deal?

We often hear talk of which team “won” a trade, despite the fact that most deals are driven at least as much by organizational need as they are asset valuation. Truthfully, assessing a swap from that perspective alone is rarely sufficient and often misleading. That being said, it can be an interesting exercise to focus purely on value, especially when a deal involves long-term assets on both sides.

That’s the way this poll will approach the recent trade between the Braves and Angels. Let’s break down the contractual assets that changed hands:

Angels Receive

• Andrelton Simmons, 26, SS — Controlled for five years with $53MM guaranteed. Arguably the game’s best defensive player, Simmons has historically been merely an average hitter for his position. He has shown some power (17 home runs in 2013), though, arguably making him a high-floor player with upside.
• Jose Briceno, 23, C — The backstop, seemingly a minor part of the deal, has yet to advance into the upper minors and struggled last year at the High-A level.

Braves Receive

• Sean Newcomb, 22, LHP — Rising prospect with 6+ years of control available who pitched at Double-A level last year. The power southpaw has significant upside but has battled control issues.
• Chris Ellis, 23, RHP — Fast-moving college arm who could contribute at the back of a rotation. He also reached Double-A in 2015 and can be controlled for 6+ seasons in majors.
• Erick Aybar, 31, SS — Entering his final year of control at a $8.5MM salary, Aybar could be an underappreciated part of this deal. He’s a quality veteran infielder coming off of a down year, but with a history of sturdy defense, good speed, and an above-average bat for a shortstop. He could also become a trade chip this winter or at the trade deadline.
• $2.5MM (representing difference between 2016 salaries of Simmons and Aybar)

Both organizations have new general managers who went out on a limb, in different ways, to strike this deal. And both talked about the value proposition that they faced (in addition to considerations of organizational need).

Angels GM Billy Eppler has many roster holes to fill, and could easily have relied on Aybar, but explained that the trade presented a rare chance to add a top-quality defender at the game’s most important position in the field. “When you have an opportunity, you do it,” he said. “The free agent market does not generally offer a plentiful amount of shortstops. It was a supply-and-demand equation.” Only that kind of premium ability could justify giving up Newcomb’s huge arm, per Eppler, who said that doing so “gives you a lot of pause and makes your stomach hurt a little bit.”

For Braves GM John Coppolella, meanwhile, there were also references to the need to seize an opportunity to acquire hard-to-get assets at an appealing price. “It’s a very tough trade, and a painful trade for us,” he said. “We didn’t want to trade Andrelton Simmons. But we felt this was too good for us to pass up. We felt like we were getting so much talent back in this deal, that if we didn’t make this trade, it would be very tough for us to keep going forward with our plans.” He went on to discuss the importance of Aybar to the swap, noting that the deal was not “some kind of prospect trade,” but rather “was a value-for-value trade that had two really good prospects in it.”

So, both general managers felt so torn about the deal that their comments referenced pain (physical or otherwise). Yet both also saw a value proposition that was simply too good to pass up. The Halos pulled the trigger even though they already had a good shortstop in place for 2016 and will have rotation openings thereafter. And the rebuilding Braves made the deal despite Simmons’ youth and control, not to mention the fact that they have already built a stable of young pitching through other trades.

We’ll have to wait to see how things play out, of course, but it’s still fun to ask: if you were forced to take one side of this deal, from a pure value perspective (i.e., ignoring team-specific context), which one would you take?

Let’s be honest: this is not a question we expected to be asking at the start of the year, when Marco Estrada was settling into the Blue Jays pen as a swingman and long reliever. But he impressed early, provided a solid rotation presence much of the way, and had a notable impact in the post-season. That makes it worthwhile to wonder: is a qualifying offer in play?

We already know something about Estrada’s market valuation, because the Jays acquired him early last fall from the Brewers. The swap sent first baseman Adam Lind to Milwaukee. He, too, had a nice season after the deal, but at the time it wasn’t the most impactful deal. If anything, that trade suggested that Lind was the more valuable player, since he was the more expensive side of the 1-to-1 trade. Lind cost $7.5MM last year, plus a $500K buyout on a $8MM option that wasn’t certain to be exercised (but now likely will be). Estrada, meanwhile, ultimately agreed to a $3.9MM salary to avoid arbitration.

Nothing about that trade suggested that Estrada would be valued at anything close to the qualifying offer rate. Wwhen he came to Toronto, he was coming off of a four-year run in which he compiled 509 2/3 innings of 3.99 ERA pitching, with 8.4 K/9 against 2.3 BB/9. But that K rate had been in decline, and 2013 was his worst season in the earned run department.How have things changed since? MLBTR’s Mark Polishuk took a closer look in September, but in a nutshell, it’s hard to argue with Estrada’s 2015 results: he logged a 3.13 ERA over 181 frames. But his strikeouts plummeted to 6.5 per nine, while his walks ranged above his career average to 2.7 BB/9. And ERA estimators were not pleased with the new mix of peripherals: Estrada earned a 4.40 FIP, 4.93 xFIP, and 4.64 SIERA.

It’s worth noting, also, that Estrada enjoyed a .216 batting average on balls in play against him. He’s always controlled contact, as Tony Blengino of Fangraphs has explained, but that’s still a notably low mark. He has a notably excellent change, and doesn’t rely on velocity, so you might like his chances going forward. But Estrada has already turned 32 years of age, so that’s not on his side, either.

Then again, the post-season provided Estrada an opportunity to put his abilities on display before the entire league, and he didn’t disappoint. In 19 1/3 innings over three starts, he allowed just five earned runs while striking out 15 and issuing only one walk.

All said, there’s reason for some skepticism, but also reason to believe that some team will make Estrade a three-year offer at a healthy AAV. And given that possibility, he might be inclined to test the market for what will likely be his best chance at a multi-year deal. Meanwhile, a pitching-needy Toronto club might feel okay about taking the risk that Estrada will accept a $15.8MM, one-year qualifying offer. That wouldn’t exactly be crippling for a large-budget contender, even if he’s only a solid back-of-the-rotation piece.

It’ll be fascinating to see what happens with Estrada. For now, let’s see what MLBTR’s readers think: should the Jays make him a qualifying offer?

The NLCS matchup between the Cubs and Mets fell flat, as New York steamrolled their fellow upstarts. Chicago, though, did just fine in the clubs’ regular season tilts (they swept New York in seven games) and had the better regular season record (by exactly those seven wins). While the Mets are focused now on the World Series, it’s back to the future all over again for the Cubbies.

It’s hardly novel to observe that these two clubs are both loaded with young, somewhat opposed talent bases, with the Cubs having more on the position player side and the Mets carrying a better stable of pitching. Quite apart from the head-to-head results, then, it seems interesting to consider which organization has the better outlook after both put up huge seasons.

Each club has some significant players who’ll be controlled for two more seasons, barring extensions — Jake Arrieta and Lucas Duda come to mind — as well as some notable near-MLB prospects — such as Billy McKinney and Brandon Nimmo. But perhaps the most telling comparison, for near and long-term outlook, is of the players who have already reached the majors and are under control for three or more seasons beyond 2015. Here’s a list of some notable names to consider:

Cubs: Jon Lester, Starlin Castro, Anthony Rizzo, Jorge Soler, Hector Rondon, Javier Baez, Kris Bryant, Carl Edwards, Addison Russell, Kyle Schwarber, Arismendy Alcantara

Mets: David Wright, Matt Harvey, Zack Wheeler, Jacob deGrom, Travis d’Arnaud, Jeurys Familia, Wilmer Flores, Noah Syndergaard, Steven Matz, Dilson Herrera, Michael Conforto

So, which organizational arrangement would you prefer moving forward?

Entering the season, Ian Desmond carried the reputation of being one of the game’s top all-around shortstops. From 2012-14, he averaged 23 homers and 22 steals per season, hitting .275/.326/.462 and playing passable, if unspectacular defense along the way. Depending on your defensive metrics of choice (DRS considered him below average, while UZR said slightly above average), Desmond was consistently worth about 3.5 to 4.5 wins per season. That kind of track record and the fact that he didn’t turn 30 until this summer made a $100MM+ commitment on the free agent market seem likely. (Desmond had, in fact, already turned down an offer in excess of $100MM from the Nationals, though it was said to come with a large amount of deferred money.)

The first three and a half months of the season, though, could scarcely have been worse. Desmond struggled in the field immensely and even more so at the plate. On July 19, his season batting line bottomed out at an unthinkable and uncharacteristic .204/.248/.324. While that cutoff is admittedly very arbitrary, his production following that date more or less mirrored his excellent numbers from 2012-14; Desmond hit .272/.343/.464 with 12 homers and eight steals over his final 68 contests. Unfortunately for him, his overall season line wasn’t salvageable. He finished his walk year at .233/.290/.384.

The question now facing Desmond is what that ugly three-and-a-half-month run did to his free agent stock. Disastrous first half aside, his strong finish probably did restore some value in the eyes of interested parties, and there’s little else available on the shortstop market. Asdrubal Cabrera is coming off a nice season, but teams have long been wary of his defense and some may view him as a second baseman. Other options such as Jimmy Rollins, Alexei Ramirez and Stephen Drew had equally, if not more disappointing seasons.

While some will suggest that Desmond accept a qualifying offer (if it’s made) or sign a one-year deal to rebuild value, few players want to go the one-year route, and it’d be surprising to see the lone prominent shortstop on the market not end up with a rather sizable multi-year deal. But let’s see what MLBTR readers think.

For this exercise, we’ll focus on the number of guaranteed years, rather than the average annual value of those seasons. Which scenario do you see as most likely?