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A few days back, T.J. Zuppe of The Athletic sat down with former ALCS MVP and current MLBPA player rep Andrew Miller for a chat about what he describes as the “science” aspect in the game of baseball across the past couple of years. Specifically, the two talked about the way pitcher usage is slowly morphing towards a landscape in which each individual matchup, and the leverage situation in each of them, has a much greater impact on when and how pitchers are used.

Perhaps the most notable aspect of their conversation is the subject of the arbitration process as it relates to relief pitchers. Miller describes the arbitration process as “a little bit behind”, which makes a lot of sense considering the fact that reliever raises take the saves stat into significant consideration. With reliever usage shifting the way it has been (the usage of Miller, Josh Hader and Sergio Romo are all good examples), the correlation between the best relievers and the relievers earning the most saves will continue to decrease.

One other item that Miller brought up is that perhaps stats like WPA will end up coming more into play as the arbitration process adapts (painfully slowly) to the way players are valued in free agency. Even that, however, could be problematic considering that Tampa Bay’s “openers” won’t work in particularly high leverage situations to begin the game (as Miller himself notes).

If the way relievers are rewarded during arbitration doesn’t already seem silly to you, consider the fact that, if both entered arbitration today, Arodys Vizcaino would be likely to earn a far larger raise than Josh Hader due to his accumulation of saves, or in essence, the fact that he’s been used in the ninth inning more frequently during his career. Hader, of course, is considered to be a far better relief pitcher based on nearly every statistical category typically used to evaluate reliever value.

One of the issues this creates, says Miller, is an incentive for pre-arb or arb-eligible players (and their agents) to push for use in certain innings, rather than accept the assignments they’re given during the game. Speaking from a hypothetical player’s point of view, Miller says, “If the only difference is the situation I’m pitching in, that’s worth $4 million, I want that $4 million. I’m going to go in there (and demand it).”

He’s right, and the fact that the arbitration system incentivizes a structure that runs somewhat contrary to the most efficient use of a bullpen seems problematic. So we want to hear your thoughts. What would you like to see happen to the arbitration process as it relates to relievers? (Poll link for app users)

Hanley Ramirez’s release became official yesterday afternoon when he went unclaimed on waivers, and he’s now a free agent who is eligible to sign with any big league team. Because the Red Sox are paying the roughly $15MM remaining on his 2018 salary, any new club can sign him to a big league deal that guarantees him only the pro-rated league minimum — roughly $358K. The vesting option that was on his last contract was torn up the moment he was released, so he’s free to sign anywhere on a straight one-year deal.

The 34-year-old Ramirez was outstanding in April (.330/.400/.474) and abysmal in May (.163/.200/.300), and his overall .254/.313/.395 batting line through 195 plate appearances checks in well south of a league-average bat in the estimation of metrics like OPS+ (88) and wRC+ (90).

It’s not especially difficult to see what contributed to his downfall when looking at his batted-ball data in each month. Fangraphs credited Ramirez with a whopping 40.3 percent hard-contact rate in April, and he posted an excellent 24.7 percent line-drive rate that month. In May, his hard-hit rate plummeted to to just 20.9 percent, and his line-drive rate dropped to 4.5 percent. The cause of that deterioration in quality of contact, of course, will be up to his next team to determine, but it’s clear that Ramirez was going through something more than a mere BABIP-fueled slump.

Where exactly he’ll sign in the coming days figures to be a source of no small amount of speculation (both here and elsewhere). Ramirez’s recent plate appearances were clearly not encouraging, nor was a 2017 season in which he battled shoulder injuries and hit just .242/.320/.429, albeit with 23 homers. Ramirez hasn’t had a healthy, productive full season in the big leagues since slashing .286/.361/.505 with 30 big flies and 28 doubles in 620 PAs with the 2016 Red Sox. It’s a lot to expect him to return to that at age 34, even if his shoulder is recovered from 2017’s injuries.

Still, Ramirez is a no-risk proposition for any club that signs him, and if he can provide even slightly above-average production at the plate, he’d be a fine asset to acquire at the minimum rate. Given his track record and the relative peanuts he’ll cost, it’s a virtual lock that Ramirez will sign with what will be his fourth MLB organization over the next few days.

The Rockies jump out as an immediate potential fit. Ian Desmond has been their primary first baseman, but they’ve cycled through a few players at the position and received a disastrous .190/.277/.346 from their first basemen on the season. Ramirez wouldn’t even need to improve upon his overall season output to date in order to represent a massive upgrade for the Rox; merely hitting at a below-average but still-competent rate would improve their lineup substantially.

The Mets have been an oft-speculated fit for Ramirez on Twitter, but Adrian Gonzalez and Wilmer Flores have formed roughly average platoon at first base, and it’d be a surprise to see the Mets jettison one veteran first baseman with an average bat to pick up another who hits from the same side of the dish as Flores.

Braves fans have suggested that Ramirez could play third for them as a bridge to prospect Austin Riley, but it doesn’t seem likely that any club would give Ramirez regular reps at a position other than first base. Still, Atlanta did roll the dice on a comeback tour at the hot corner for Jose Bautista, so perhaps the idea shouldn’t be entirely dismissed.

Generally speaking, the bulk of the contending clubs in the National League have received solid production at first base, so it’s seems far more likely he’ll end up in the American League rather than get buried as a bench bat on an NL roster. After all, the DH slot can help mask the fact that he’s somewhat of a defensive liability.

The Orioles and Royals are the only two teams who have failed to get above-replacement-level production from both their first base and DH slots on the whole. With that in mind, though, the Orioles already have three first base/DH types on their roster and therefore would have to jettison one of Pedro Alvarez or Danny Valencia. Both of those players have been generally productive on the year, so a move to acquire Ramirez wouldn’t make much sense. The Royals, though, have been rolling out Hunter Dozier at first base. He has options remaining, and Ramirez could prove an upgrade if he’s able to put an ugly May behind him.

One has to wonder how much longer the Blue Jays will be willing to send Kendrys Morales to the plate; after being worth -0.6 fWAR last season due to a wRC+ of just 97 across 608 plate appearances, he’s already matched that negative fWAR total in just 141 PA in 2018 thanks to a .208/.284/.344 batting line. Ramirez would provide the Jays with a clear upgrade at DH.

The Rays and White Sox both stand out as teams who would benefit from having Ramirez in the lineup. The Rays haven’t gotten much out of Brad Miller this season or last, while the White Sox seem to have a rotating cast of rookies and sophomores cycling through that slot in their lineup. Still, being that both clubs are in rebuilding phases, it’s possible that they’d benefit more from simply seeing what they have in young players.

We’ll leave it up to the readers at this point. Where do you think Ramirez will end up? (Poll link for app users)

Today’s deal between the Padres and Twins will colloquially be known by fans as “the Phil Hughes trade” due to the veteran righty’s prominence.  “The extra Competitive Balance draft pick trade” may not quite roll off the tongue as well, though from San Diego’s perspective, the trade was really all about securing the 74th overall pick of next week’s amateur draft, at the cost of paying $7.5MM of Hughes’ remaining salary obligations and sending catching prospect Janigson Villalobos to the Twins.

This is the latest in the series of trades involving the Competitive Balance Round picks since the extra selections were instituted in the 2012-2017 collective bargaining agreement.  (Here is the full listing of the order for Competitive Balance Rounds A and B in the 2018 draft — some of the exact numbering of the picks has changed due to the addition of free agent compensation picks being added ahead of CBR-A.)  The Competitive Balance Round picks are unique since they are the only selections that can actually be traded, and they have become a unique bargaining chip in several deals, with such names as Hughes, Craig Kimbrel, Alex Wood, Jim Johnson, Jose Peraza, Bryan Morris, Brian Matusz, and Bud Norris switching teams as part of trades involving these picks.

None of these deals have exactly been blockbusters; several have been little more than salary dumps, with teams willing to surrender this extra pick to get some money off the books (i.e. the Twins and Hughes).  Still, just the fact that some picks are available at all has added another layer of strategy in recent years, leading one to wonder just what would happen if Major League Baseball decided to make any and all draft picks eligible to be dealt.

Jayson Stark explored this same question in a piece for ESPN.com back in 2015, with several unnamed front office executives arguing in favor of picks being traded.  The general consensus was that the ability to trade picks would greatly elevate fan interest in the draft — trades are, of course, major reasons why the NFL, NBA, and NHL drafts carry a higher profile than MLB’s amateur selection process.  One American League exec claimed widespread support for the pick-trading idea (“I don’t know anybody who’s not in favor of that at this point“) around the game, though no changes of this nature were implemented when the new collective bargaining agreement was agreed upon in the 2016-17 offseason.

The stricter slotting and draft pool system, Stark argues, has already helped dampen long-standing concerns that trading picks could lead to big-market teams dealing picks for high-salaried players, or agents being able to manipulate their young clients’ landing spots.  Both of these things already happen to some extent anyway (dumping salary in exchange for a draft pick isn’t really any different than dumping salary for a prospect already in someone’s farm system), and it’s possible that the ability to trade picks could actually help smaller-market teams get competitive quicker, given the criticisms leveled at the draft pool process.

Along these same lines, I would argue that if MLB is worried about draft trades leading to some type of seismic shift in the player movement market, the league probably has little to worry about.  We’ve already seen how the greater value teams put on draft picks has impacted the free agent market (particularly with qualifying offer free agents), so there isn’t as much chance you’d see a team unload several picks for an established superstar.  Such deals are more common in the NBA or the NFL given how the addition of one star rookie can instantly turn a team around, whereas in baseball, even the bluest of blue-chip prospects generally spend at least a couple of years in the minors and are rarely superstars from day one.  As added precaution, perhaps baseball could institute its own version of the NBA’s “Ted Stepien Rule,” or maybe a cap could be instituted on the number of extra picks a team could acquire in any one given draft.

While any changes to the draft wouldn’t happen until the next CBA, the Competitive Balance Round deals and teams’ ability to deal international draft pool slots have indicated that the league is showing some flexibility when it comes to trades involving amateur talent movement, as one NL executive noted to Stark.  I’d argue that another potential next step would be to allow teams to deal the other “extra” picks available in the current format — namely, the compensatory picks given to teams after their free agents reject qualifying offers to sign elsewhere.  These picks are currently available either after the first round, after Competitive Balance Round B, or after the fourth round.

Let’s open the debate up to the MLBTR readership. (poll link for app users)

Most readers have probably already caught wind of the suggestion that MLB should shave a few games off the incredibly long season. But fewer readers probably realize that it’s actually a topic that’s gained some very real momentum. In a lengthy piece on the subject, Jayson Stark of The Athletic dives into this issue, at one point revealing that the topic of a 158-game season actually made it to the “bargaining table” in the negotiations leading up to the 2011 labor agreement. In 2016, MLB actually did some extensive research on the potential effects of a 154-game season due to a suspicion that the players might bring it up, but the union apparently didn’t bring it up; they were focused on other issues.

While eight games might seem like a trivial percentage of the season, it could actually pose a significant reduction in revenue for MLB clubs. According to statista.com, the Yankees brought in about $278MM in ticket revenue during the 2017 season. A 5% reduction in games would mean losing out on nearly $14MM in ticket sales, not to mention they’d be worth 5% less in terms of a television contract.

Of course, the Yankees are an extreme example in that regard; small market clubs make much, much less on an annual basis when it comes to ticket sales. As such, it’s not surprising to learn that twenty-two MLB clubs reportedly had little or no objection to a 154 season; it seems that a vocal eight-team minority would have likely proved a holdup in negotiations.

It’s also easy to imagine that cutting player salaries would be one of the first orders of business in the event of a shortened season. After all, it’s unfair to expect ownership to pay players the same amount for playing 5% fewer games. While Cubs first baseman Anthony Rizzo seems to be sympathetic to the idea of making less money in order to play a more comfortable season, it seems awfully likely that there’d be some ruckus from at least some of the players. With all the recent pushback over the idea of something as simple as a pitch clock, you can bet that there’d be some loud voices where millions of dollars are concerned.

The benefits to a shorter season, though, are numerous and logically sound. Stark makes a great point when mentioning that beginning the season in the third week of April rather than the final days of March would lop off a dramatic majority of the games played in uncomfortably cold weather; weather that makes the games less enjoyable for both the players and the fans who come out to the ballpark. It’s fair to imagine that the number of injuries and illnesses increase as a result of playing in extreme cold. The number of postponements due to inclement weather also complicate the season schedule.

Concurrently, a shorter season would mean a better chance that the final games of the playoffs could conclude before cold weather sets in. Stark also suggests a longer All-Star break, as well as making all Mondays off-days. From my vantage point, it’s a bit confusing to see how all these things could be implemented with a reduction of only eight games, even if Stark does mention the idea of a few planned doubleheaders scattered throughout the season.

Perhaps one of the most important benefits to a shortened season with more days off is the health and energy of the players. Stark suggests that pitcher injuries could be reduced, which makes plenty of sense. Not only would fewer games make for fewer physically taxing stretches of baseball, but it would also allow players more time to rest and recuperate from smaller nagging injuries without putting their respective teams at a disadvantage.

On a grander scale, this kind of change could have an impact on gameplay and even roster makeup. More intermittent days off would likely allow teams to get by without a fifth starter for large stretches of the season, potentially eliminating many starting pitcher jobs around the league. It could also allow teams to feel more comfortable rolling with one fewer reliever for extended stretches, and it certainly makes sense to think that teams wouldn’t be forced to reach into their vertical depth at Triple-A for a fresh bullpen arm as often as they are now. Basically, while a shorter season could mean a more comfortable job for the players, it could also make for a game in which a small number of pitchers begin to lose their jobs in favor of bench bats or late-inning defensive replacement types.

With all this in mind, what do you think? Should MLB shorten the baseball season to 154 games, or keep things the way they are? (Poll link for app users)