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Creative Playoff Expansion Can Get a Deal Done

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Dr. Matt Swartz is a Labor Economist who has researched and published on MLB labor markets for over a decade at websites including The Hardball Times, FanGraphs, and Baseball Prospectus, as well as at MLB Trade Rumors. Matt created the arbitration salary projection model for MLB Trade Rumors, and co-created the SIERA pitching statistic available at FanGraphs. He has consulted for a Major League team since 2013, in addition to working in his day job as an economist in the cable industry. This article reflects his own opinion and not that of any of his employers or clients.

Previous posts: Resolving This Player-Owner Dispute Should Be Easy; MLB Collective Bargaining and Risk Sharing.

There is a way that players can get prorated salaries for a 72-game regular season and the owners can make enough money to only pay the equivalent of 68% of prorated salaries. We know the way that owners will agree to a deal with prorated salaries for 2020; they insist they need the revenue to make up for losses incurred during the regular season. While both owners and players have proposed expanded playoffs as a way to increase that revenue, they have been unable to create enough revenue for the owners to bite. I have a solution for this problem—start the playoffs earlier, add playoff teams, make the series longer, and reap the extra television revenue. There is more than enough there to get a deal done.

The biggest roadblock to completing a deal is the combination of the union’s insistence that players be paid on a prorated basis per regular season game, and the owners’ insistence that players take less than their prorated salaries due to absence of fans in the stands. Players have shown a willingness to extend the playoffs—effectively playing some games for free. Owners have shown some willingness to put on a 50-game shortened season with typical playoff structure, but have balked apparently at the risk of the players filing a grievance for not putting on as long a season as possible.

Eugene Freedman tweeted to me earlier in this series that the reason players were so insistent on prorated salaries is to avoid precedent. If this is true, the only way around this is finding more revenue sources—something the player proposals have hinted at, but not provided adequately to appease owners.

The owners have repeatedly centered on completing the regular season by September 27 and the World Series by the end of October, fearing that a second wave of COVID-19 in the fall could preclude the playoffs.

Fans have an additional concern that my proposal would resolve—they want to make sure that the World Series Champion deserves their title. A shortened season, combined with expanded playoffs, naturally increases the possibility that a mediocre team could walk away with the crown.

They could solve this by ending the regular season 10 days early to end on September 17, using doubleheaders and other ways to get to 72 games (or just shrinking the season further if the players are amenable). Then they would have 10 extra days to get in a lot more playoff games.

My proposal is that playoffs are expanded to 16 teams, but that all 15 series are Best-of-Seven series. On average, this will increase the expected number of nationally broadcast playoff games from 36 to 90 – a whopping increase of 150%. With $787 million reportedly at stake in television revenue for those 36 playoff games, it stands to reason that networks would pay at least half as much for the addition 54 games as the original 36, which brings in something like a whopping $590 million in extra revenue.

If players are content to simply get by on prorated salaries for 72 regular season games, they would receive about $1.84 billion in revenue. The owners’ extra playoff revenue places them in the equivalent position of 68% of prorated salaries. Marginal costs of operating these games are probably small enough to keep this only a couple percent higher. The owners almost certainly need the players to take a haircut smaller than 32%, so there is plenty of room for give in this approach. Even if networks were only willing to pay a third of the per-playoff-game rate, that would still be enough revenue to get owners to effectively pay the equivalent of 79% of prorated salaries. There is probably even room in there to give the players some playoff share, cover some marginal costs of games, and other things that could be required for this to be profitable to owners and acceptable to players.

As a result, the odds that an inferior team wins a given series are lower, and it becomes more likely that a deserving champion is crowned. The league could even take further advantage of the empty-stadium format by tilting home field advantage entirely towards the team with the superior regular season record.

I have researched home field advantage extensively, and have learned that rather than home crowd support or even last at-bats, the real reason home field advantage exists is that players are more familiar with their own parks. Teams who are home for a 7-game series will have a 59% chance of winning an evenly matched series already. A superior team certainly could easily have a 70% chance of winning a series in many cases.

This seems to be something that would accomplish the requisite situation for all parties, and there are many other ways that players could help teams add revenue without sacrificing their prorated salary demand. But the key is many more playoff games, since that is the only way owners make back losses they claim from the regular season, and the only way players do not have to surrender their principle of prorated salaries.

Reds Have Nearly $300MM In Post-2020 Payroll Promises

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2020 salary terms still need to be hammered out. But what about what’s owed to players beyond that point? The near-term economic picture remains questionable at best. That’ll make teams all the more cautious with guaranteed future salaries.

Every organization has some amount of future cash committed to players, all of it done before the coronavirus pandemic swept the globe. There are several different ways to look at salaries; for instance, for purposes of calculating the luxury tax, the average annual value is the touchstone, with up-front bonuses spread over the life of the deal. For this exercise, we’ll focus on actual cash outlays that still have yet to be paid.

We’ll run through every team, with a big assist from the Cot’s Baseball Contracts database. Prior entries can be found here. Next up is the Reds:

*Includes buyouts on club options over Joey Votto, Mike Moustakas, Eugenio Suarez, Wade Miley, and Tucker Barnhart

*Includes deferrals and buyout on mutual option in Nick Castellanos contract; Castellanos may opt out after 2020 or 2021

(click to expand/view detail list)

MLB Collective Bargaining and Risk Sharing

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Dr. Matt Swartz is a Labor Economist who has researched and published on MLB labor markets for over a decade at websites including The Hardball Times, FanGraphs, and Baseball Prospectus, as well as at MLB Trade Rumors. Matt created the arbitration salary projection model for MLB Trade Rumors, and co-created the SIERA pitching statistic available at FanGraphs. He has consulted for a Major League team since 2013, in addition to working in his day job as an economist in the cable industry. This article reflects his own opinion and not that of any of his employers or clients.

In essence, every proposal floated by the owners has requested that players assume the downside risk associated with lower ticket revenue. Part of the reason I suspect this is offensive to players is that owners have benefited substantially in recent years from upside risk associated with television revenue, and little to none has found its way into player salaries.

To understand why, all we need is a superficial understanding of labor economics. Baseball’s free agent market follows those models better than perhaps either side realizes. Owners offer free agents certain salaries because they believe that their labor will generate as much money in revenue. Yet owners primarily get their revenue from two sources: tickets and television.

Since what free agents are actually selling is wins, the translation from ticket revenue to free agent salaries is obvious. Teams sell more tickets when they win more games. Especially if those wins push them further in the playoffs, they sell substantially more season tickets in subsequent seasons. Teams readily pay free agents with this in mind.

Yet the translation from television revenue to free agents is virtually nonexistent. National television deals with ESPN, TBS, and FOX are distributed to all teams, regardless of how many games they win. Regional Sports Networks often sign multi-decade contracts with teams to broadcast their games, which also are unaltered by win totals in a given season.

The reason this matters, and the reason this is a source of acrimony between the owners and players now, is that television revenue has grown far more quickly than ticket revenue. Player salaries have grown in magnitude about as much as ticket revenues have— suggesting this theory is likely true. Owners have seen higher profits from faster growing television revenue.

Consider my rough estimates in the graph below. Here I have used Baseball Prospectus payroll totals, approximate average ticket prices from various sources, average attendance from Baseball Reference, and Maury Brown’s (now unavailable) BizOfBaseball.com website and Forbes articles for total revenue. None of these figures are exact but they are certainly close enough that the message and pattern is obvious. Players have seen salary growth (red) almost exactly in accordance with the growth rate of ticket revenues (green), while owners’ profits have grown more quickly as they pocket the faster-growing television revenue (blue). This is not the owners pulling the wool over the union’s eyes—it is just the structure of their agreements in which the payroll share of revenue is not fixed as it is in other sports, but tied to owner incentives that have not kept up with total revenue.

If the owners want the players to accept the downside risk associated with low ticket revenue, they need to find a way to share the upside risk associated with higher television revenue.

A starting point is simple. Instead of minimum salaries defined exactly by the CBA, let free agent and arbitration prices be set in excess of the salary minimums, and set future salary minimums distributed to all players. Let those minimums represent some fixed X% of the cumulative national television deals. Bargain about that percentage, but when TBS offers 40% more in their next deal than their current deal, players will see that upside. In exchange, when future identifiable events lower ticket revenue— e.g. say government regulations of Y% reduced capacity in stadiums due to COVID-19 in 2021– the players will accept lower salaries by Z%. This gives players exposure to upside and gives owners protection from downside. Everything else is bargaining around X, Y, and Z%.

Now is the time for the players to request this. Now is the time for the owners to offer this. It need not even be for 2020– that ship may have sailed already. By right now, there is downside risk associated with empty seats associated with 2021. If owners want players to assume lower salaries in such a situation, they should make an offer to give the players a piece of future television revenue growth now. Otherwise, the players will again be asking the owners the same question next year: “Why should we accept this downside risk?”

Breaking Down The Brewers’ Interesting Slate Of Future Contracts

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2020 salary terms still need to be hammered out. But what about what’s owed to players beyond that point? The near-term economic picture remains questionable at best. That’ll make teams all the more cautious with guaranteed future salaries.

Every organization has some amount of future cash committed to players, all of it done before the coronavirus pandemic swept the globe. There are several different ways to look at salaries; for instance, for purposes of calculating the luxury tax, the average annual value is the touchstone, with up-front bonuses spread over the life of the deal. For this exercise, we’ll focus on actual cash outlays that still have yet to be paid.

We’ll run through every team, with a big assist from the Cot’s Baseball Contracts database. Prior entries can be found here. Next up is the Brewers:

*Includes deferrals in Christian Yelich and Lorenzo Cain contracts

*Includes deferrals and buyout on mutual option in Ryan Braun contract

*Includes buyouts on club options over Freddy Peralta, Avisail Garcia, Justin Smoak, Jedd Gyorko, Brock Holt, Eric Sogard, and David Phelps

(click to expand/view detail list)

Calculating The Cards’ Future Contract Guarantees

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2020 salary terms still need to be hammered out. But what about what’s owed to players beyond that point? The near-term economic picture remains questionable at best. That’ll make teams all the more cautious with guaranteed future salaries.

Every organization has some amount of future cash committed to players, all of it done before the coronavirus pandemic swept the globe. There are several different ways to look at salaries; for instance, for purposes of calculating the luxury tax, the average annual value is the touchstone, with up-front bonuses spread over the life of the deal. For this exercise, we’ll focus on actual cash outlays that still have yet to be paid.

We’ll run through every team, with a big assist from the Cot’s Baseball Contracts database. Prior entries can be found here. Next up is the Cardinals:

*Includes remaining bonus payments owed to Paul Goldschmidt, Miles Mikolas, and Dexter Fowler

*Includes buyouts on club options in Carlos Martinez, Paul DeJong, Matt Carpenter, Andrew Miller, and Kolten Wong contracts

(click to expand/view detail list)

Resolving This Player-Owner Dispute Should Be Easy

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Dr. Matt Swartz is a Labor Economist who has researched and published on MLB labor markets for over a decade at websites including The Hardball Times, FanGraphs, and Baseball Prospectus, as well as at MLB Trade Rumors. Matt created the arbitration salary projection model for MLB Trade Rumors, and co-created the SIERA pitching statistic available at FanGraphs. He has consulted for a Major League team since 2013, in addition to working in his day job as an economist in the cable industry. This article reflects his own opinion and not that of any of his employers or clients.

The MLB Owners and MLB Players Association have been unable to reach an agreement for the financial terms of the 2020 season, and at this point they may not reach one at all. Both sides have focused publicly on the morality of their case, each believing they have the ethical upper hand. Neither has made proposals that reflect their actual negotiating position. That the arguments have primarily focused on morality is perhaps not surprising, but it doesn’t create fertile ground for an actual substantive negotiation. I studied bargaining theory, and I don’t remember anything about how to win a moral argument. The ethics are what they are, and any reasonable person could make either side’s case if they really tried. The union seems to be winning the PR war thus far, as fans seem to mostly blame owners, but supportive tweets from fans are not convertible into currency.

At its core, what we have is the following set up: The presumptive default position, if no agreement is reached, is that commissioner Rob Manfred will order a roughly 50-game season with full prorated salaries. If the sides do reach an agreement, they may play as many as 80 games, and be able to split the associated revenue. They also may be able to add revenue through other avenues like expanded playoffs, and they could split that revenue too. Those are the gains from a negotiated agreement. They can be split in a way to make both parties better off.

Both sides have accused the other of not bargaining in good faith, but neither side has offered the other side anything they would plausibly accept. Instead we have seen the owners repeatedly try to offer players only slightly more than the same salary total as they would with a 50-game season, effectively asking for all the gains that would accrue from a negotiated agreement while leaving the players to absorb greater output and greater risk (both from the usual risk of playing baseball and the additional risk attendant to the global pandemic). The players similarly have failed to offer the owners anything that would lead to more profit than they would accrue in the event of a 50-game season with unexpanded playoffs. It is not surprising negotiations have gone nowhere.

At this point, an agreement for a better, longer season in 2020 is doubtful. But 2021 is right around the corner, and there is no vaccine for COVID-19 yet. We may not see fans in the seats in 2021, or at least we may not see stadiums filled to capacity. So we may see a replay of this argument in 2021 as well. It’s imperative that both sides recognize their position and negotiate accordingly. This acknowledgement could easily flip the script and lead to an expedited deal for 2020 already.

Let’s start with what should be obvious and unarguable.

Unarguable Point A:

Any agreement should see the players earn substantially more than they would have in a 50-game season.

Unarguable Point B:

Any agreement should see owners make more profit than they would in a 50-game season.

Nothing floated publicly has even come close to meeting these simple criteria.

The starting point here is actually fairly simple. Forget about inching towards a middle ground when neither side is willing to budge. Instead, begin by figuring out just how much extra revenue is associated with 30 extra games and an expanded postseason. Then, split it in half. The players’ salary total is equal to that half plus their prorated salaries for 50 games. Both sides may try to argue for a bigger piece of the pie, but either side would be crazy to say no to half of this revenue—which is much more than the zero extra revenue they would see otherwise. The players don’t need the owners to open their books on any more than is necessary to estimate this amount. The owners don’t need to ask the players to sign any waivers or anything else that isn’t already negotiated. Anything on top of this baseline can be negotiated after setting the above in writing and shaking hands (but not actually).

Offers could get more complicated and cover more territory. This is especially true with the risk of no fans or fewer fans in 2021, and with the CBA expiring after 2021. But the essential 2020 issue can be resolved in a fairly simple manner that makes each side better off in the short term while limiting the long-term damage to the sport. In subsequent pieces, I’ll discuss the fundamentals of baseball’s free agent market and how players might want to approach the inequities that have arguably developed over the last couple years. But for now, let’s just agree that owners, players, and fans can all be made much better off very quickly. Get it done before dinnertime.

What Do The Cubs Owe Players After 2020?

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2020 salary terms still need to be hammered out. But what about what’s owed to players beyond that point? The near-term economic picture remains questionable at best. That’ll make teams all the more cautious with guaranteed future salaries.

Every organization has some amount of future cash committed to players, all of it done before the coronavirus pandemic swept the globe. There are several different ways to look at salaries; for instance, for purposes of calculating the luxury tax, the average annual value is the touchstone, with up-front bonuses spread over the life of the deal. For this exercise, we’ll focus on actual cash outlays that still have yet to be paid.

We’ll run through every team, with a big assist from the Cot’s Baseball Contracts database. Prior entries can be found here. Next up is the Cubs:

*Includes remaining bonus payments owed to Jason Heyward

*Includes buyout on club options in Kyle Hendricks, Craig Kimbrel, David Bote, Anthony Rizzo, and Daniel Descalso contracts

*Includes buyout on mutual option in Jon Lester contract

(click to expand/view detail list)

The Longest Flirtation In Baseball

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For those who love the will-they-won’t-they back-and-forth of a classic rom-com, Major League Baseball has a story for you. The Chicago White Sox and lefty hurler Gio Gonzalez are drawn to each other. There’s no denying the connection. They’re the Ross and Rachel of the MLB (or Jim and Pam, or whatever reference is relevant these days). Though they’ve never stayed together long, these would-be soulmates are on the verge of finally making it work. Should baseball return in 2020, their long-standing flirtation should finally consummate with Gonzalez in black-and-white, taking the hill in front of the Southside faithful.

Gonzalez, 34, has long been a productive pitcher in the bigs, but he hasn’t gotten the respect he deserves of late. Though Gonzalez is aging, he certainly pitched well enough to prove himself a viable rotation candidate. And yet, following the 2018 season, Gonzalez languished on the free-agent market. He eventually accepted a minor league deal with the Yankees, but he never made an appearance for their big-league team. He found his way back to Milwaukee where he went 3-2 with a 3.50 ERA/4.04 FIP across 87 1/3 innings (17 starts). Again, solid numbers for Gonzalez, but again there wasn’t much buzz around him as he returned to free agency.

Fear not, for an old friend came to the rescue. The White Sox signed Gonzalez to a $5MM guarantee just before Christmas with plans of slotting him into the rotation. The White Sox are a team on the rise with a young rotation in need of guaranteed, quality innings. Lucas Giolito and Dallas Keuchel are set to front the rotation with less proven assets like Reynaldo Lopez and Dylan Cease likely to follow. Gonzalez should help the young arms take their time and weather the storm, should there be one.

Regardless of fit, we know the White Sox like Gonzalez. This was, after all, the third time they’d acquired him. The White Sox first drafted Gonzalez 38th overall in the 2004 June Draft. But he didn’t last long in their system, as the Sox traded Gonzalez to the Phillies after the 2005 season (with Aaron Rowand and Daniel Haigwood) for Jim Thome.

Just a year later, Gonzalez found himself headed back to Chicago. The White Sox and Phillies connected on a new deal wherein the Phils acquired Freddy Garcia for Gonzalez and Gavin Floyd. Garcia made just 11 starts for the Phillies before leaving as a free agent after 2007. Floyd found his sea legs in Chicago after struggling to make good on his top draft pick status in Philly. He ended up playing seven seasons with the White Sox, going 63-65 with a 4.22 ERA/4.20 FIP in that time, settling in as a decent rotation piece.

Gonzalez’s second stint with the White Sox lasted barely longer than the first. He did, however, begin to flourish. Upon his return, Gonzalez quickly became a top arm in their system, topping out of as their number one ranked prospect by Baseball America in 2008 (#26 overall in the majors).

Still, they traded him – again – this time to the Oakland Athletics (along with Fautino De Los Santos and Ryan Sweeney) in exchange for Nick Swisher. Swisher was a personality match with the White Sox, a spiritual successor to Rowand and other hard-nosed dirt dogs to play on the grass in Chicago – but he only lasted one season (.219/.332/.410 with 24 home runs).

Gonzalez became the gem of that deal for Oakland, making his debut in 2008 as a 22-year-old. It took Gonzalez a couple seasons to find his footing, but by the end of 2011, Gonzalez was an established pro. He put together back-to-back 200-inning seasons for the A’s, amassing 8.3 rWAR/6.5 fWAR across 2010 and 2011 before Oakland shipped him to Washington.

At this point, Gonzalez was entering his age-26 season with some runway to finally settle in after being traded four times already. Gonzalez became a rotation stalwart for the Nationals from 2012 to 2018, a two-time All-Star, and a 124-game winner.

His best season was his first in Washington. The 26-year-old Gonzalez led the league in wins going 21-8 with a 2.89 ERA/2.82 FIP across 199 1/3 innings. As the Nats’ nominal ace, Gonzalez led them to their first-ever postseason appearance. Of course, this was the season the Nationals famously withheld Stephen Strasburg from the playoffs to ensure his long-term health. An undercurrent of that story, however, was Gonzalez, whose dominance that year made such a bold move possible. Gio started games one and five of the NLDS, pitching well but lasting just five innings in both outings – a common thread for Gonzalez. The Nats went 1-1 in those games but ultimately lost the series to the Cardinals.

Gonzalez never put up another season quite like his 2012, but he nonetheless gave the Nats solid work for 6+ seasons. Regardless, there wasn’t a ton of interest when the Nats shopped him during the 2018 season. Gonzalez was eventually traded to the Brewers, for whom he pitched well in five late-season starts. He even got a pair of postseason starts, though he went just two innings in the first outing and left due to injury one inning into his second.

Eight seasons after arriving in Washington and 16 years after Chicago selected him in the first round, Gonzalez may finally have the opportunity to pitch for the White Sox. Of course, a lot stands in the way of Gonzalez making his debut in Chicago, but that’s nothing new. Now in his third stint in the organization, the White Sox hope Gonzalez will help lead this young team.

Of course, if they don’t make the leap many expect, Chicago could embark on one last selloff of veterans before making a run at contention again in 2021. If that happens, Gonzalez could find his name in the trade papers once again. But for now, as before, Gio Gonzalez is a member of the Chicago White Sox.

Nats’ Convoluted Pitching Contracts Make Up Most Of Future Payroll Cost

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2020 salary terms still need to be hammered out. But what about what’s owed to players beyond that point? The near-term economic picture remains questionable at best. That’ll make teams all the more cautious with guaranteed future salaries.

Every organization has some amount of future cash committed to players, all of it done before the coronavirus pandemic swept the globe. There are several different ways to look at salaries; for instance, for purposes of calculating the luxury tax, the average annual value is the touchstone, with up-front bonuses spread over the life of the deal. For this exercise, we’ll focus on actual cash outlays that still have yet to be paid.

We’ll run through every team, with a big assist from the Cot’s Baseball Contracts database. Prior entries can be found here. Next up is the Nationals:

*Includes deferred salary and interest in Stephen Strasburg contract

*Includes deferred salary in Max Scherzer and Patrick Corbin contracts

*Includes buyouts on club options over Howie Kendrick, Anibal Sanchez, Adam Eaton, and Eric Thames

(click to expand/view detail list)

The 2015 Top 10: A Superstar Is Born

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We’ve already reviewed the top 10 picks from the 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2013 drafts. Let’s now take a look at the 2015 class. A half-decade later, one player stands miles above the rest.

1.) Dansby Swanson, SS, Diamondbacks:

  • Swanson never appeared in a game for Arizona, which made the widely panned decision to trade him in a package for then-Braves righty Shelby Miller in the same year it drafted him. As MLBTR’s George Miller wrote several weeks, the Braves have indeed gotten far more value from the trade than the D-backs. For his part, the light-hitting Swanson hasn’t been great. However, he has been a passable, inexpensive regular. Not a ringing endorsement, but it’s at least more than can be said for some other No. 1 picks.

2.) Alex Bregman, 3B/SS, Astros:

  • The Astros were only in position to select Bregman because they received a compensatory pick for failing to sign Brady Aiken, the No. 1 pick in the 2014 draft. What a break. Bregman made his debut just over a year after the Astros drafted him and has since evolved into one of the game’s elite players. The 26-year-old is now coming off his second straight MVP-level season, in which he batted .296/.423/.592 (168 wRC+), swatted 41 home runs, drew 119 unintentional walks against 83 strikeouts, and piled up 8.5 fWAR.

3.) Brendan Rodgers, 2B/SS, Rockies:

  • Rodgers’ first taste of big league action didn’t go well in 2019, when he took 81 trips to the plate and batted .224/.272/.250 (25 wRC+) without a home run before undergoing season-ending shoulder surgery in July. None of that sounds good, but there remains plenty to like about Rodgers. He’s still just 23, still a high-end prospect (MLB.com ranks him No. 29), and coming off a year in which he destroyed Triple-A pitching. In 160 plate appearances at that level, Rodgers slashed .350/.412/.622 with nine homers. Even in the offensively charged Pacific Coast League, that line amounted to a wRC+ of 147.

4.) Dillon Tate, RHP, Rangers:

  • Tate, 26, made his major league debut in 2019 with 21 innings of 6.43 ERA ball, but not before being part of two notable trades in preceding years. The Rangers sent Tate to the Yankees in a 2016 deal for Carlos Beltran, and then New York sent the hurler to Baltimore in 2018 to acquire Zack Britton.

5.) Kyle Tucker, OF, Astros:

  • Tucker hasn’t gotten much of a chance in Houston (he totaled 72 plate appearances in each of the previous two seasons), but he remains a touted 23-year-old whom the franchise has been loath to surrender in a trade. If a 2020 season does happen, Tucker could get a better opportunity to establish himself. It should at least come by 2021, as Houston’s entire starting outfield of George Springer, Michael Brantley and Josh Reddick are all due to become free agents during the upcoming winter.

6.) Tyler Jay, LHP, Twins:

  • Injuries have helped cut down Jay’s career so far. Jay never pitched for the Twins, who traded the 26-year-old to the Reds last season, nor has he reached the majors. He spent most of 2018-19 as a reliever in Double-A, where he has logged a 4.22 ERA with 7.9 K/9 and 3.9 BB/9 in 136 1/3 frames.

7.) Andrew Benintendi, OF, Red Sox:

  • By measure of wRC+, Benintendi has only been a league-average hitter in two of his three full seasons; nonetheless, he has been a productive piece for Boston, and is clearly one of the most successful members of his draft class.

8.) Carson Fulmer, RHP, White Sox:

  • As MLBTR’s Steve Adams recently noted, Fulmer was regarded as a sure bet to succeed in the majors during his time as a prospect. Unfortunately, though, he has been a flop in the bigs. The 26-year-old owns a 6.56 ERA/6.44 FIP with 7.89 K/9 and 6.08 BB/9 across 94 2/3 innings (44 appearances, 15 starts). He ran up a 6.00-plus ERA last season, mostly from Chicago’s bullpen.

9.) Ian Happ, INF/OF, Cubs:

  • Happ has given the Cubs plenty of versatility in the field while chipping in above-average offense in each of the three years he has appeared in the majors. Strikeouts were a major problem for Happ during his first two years, but he made enormous strides in that area a season ago, slashing his K rate from 36.1 percent in 2018 to 25 percent. That drastic cut helped Happ to a career-best line of .264/.333/.564 (127 wRC+), though he started 2019 in Triple-A after a miserable spring training and only appeared in 58 of Chicago’s games.

10.) Cornelius Randolph, OF, Phillies:

  • The 23-year-old Randolph hasn’t played above Double-A, where he hit .247/.324/.399 with 10 homers in 389 plate appearances last season. Randolph failed to earn a ranking from Baseball America, FanGraphs or MLB.com in any of their most recent Phillies prospects lists.

—

Combined fWAR of this bunch: 36.5. Bregman has clearly been the rising tide lifting the other boats…

  • 1.) Bregman: 20.5
  • 2.) Benintendi: 9.0
  • 3.) Happ: 4.8
  • 4.) Swanson: 3.9
  • 5.) Tate: 0.0
  • 6.) Tucker: minus-0.2
  • 7.) Rodgers: minus-0.6
  • 8.) Fulmer: minus-0.9

Left off: Jay and Randolph, who haven’t played in the league.

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