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Transaction Retrospection

The Blockbuster That Brought The Tigers Their Most Valuable Trade Chip

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The Blue Jays were the talk of the 2015 trade deadline. A few days after bringing in star shortstop Troy Tulowitzki from the Rockies, the Jays struck for the top rental starting pitcher on the market: Tigers’ left-hander David Price. Amidst a seven-year run of pristine durability and general excellence, 2015 was perhaps Price’s peak season. At the time of the deal, he was sitting on a 2.53 ERA over 146 innings.

It was a fascinating swap for a number of reasons. The 52-51 Jays were only 1.5 games above the Tigers in the standings, making the organizations’ decisions to take diverging approaches at the deadline particularly interesting. At the time, Fangraphs gave the talented, but to that point underperforming, Toronto club a 48.9% shot of reaching the postseason, while the Tigers’ playoff odds sat at a lowly 9.7%. In that context, it makes sense then-Blue Jays GM Alex Anthopolous considered the time right to push his chips in; it’s equally sensible then-Tigers GM Dave Dombrowski pivoted his organization toward a rebuild.

Just as notable was the steep acquisition cost. The Jays sent the Tigers a trio of left-handed pitching prospects, led by Daniel Norris, who had entered that season as Baseball America’s #18 overall prospect. He’d had some strike-throwing issues in the minors, but Norris looked the part of a potential power mid-rotation starter.

Unfortunately, Norris has never really made good on that immense promise. In four-plus seasons in Detroit, the former second-rounder has a cumulative 4.56 ERA/4.41 FIP in 396.1 innings. His once-dominant stuff has waxed and waned in that time. Norris quietly had a strong second half in 2019, particularly after being limited to three innings per start in August. Perhaps there’s hope yet for the 27-year-old to find his niche.

Even if Norris hasn’t turned out the way Detroit fans may have envisioned, the Tigers have gotten plenty of long-term value from the Price deal. Matthew Boyd was arguably viewed as the third piece at the time, behind Norris and Jairo Labourt. (Labourt, then a well-regarded low minors starter, never panned out, even after moving to the bullpen). Boyd had already reached the majors but was viewed as a back-of-the-rotation type. Suffice it to say most didn’t envision him emerging as one of the game’s premier strikeout artists, but that’s exactly what he did in 2019. Among pitchers with at least 100 innings, Boyd ranked thirteenth in strikeout rate (30.2%) while maintaining his long-lauded control (6.2% walk rate).

Boyd’s 4.56 ERA didn’t match up with those strong peripherals, mostly due to an abundance of home runs. Indeed, he’s a fly ball pitcher who may always serve up a few too many longballs to be a top-of-the-rotation arm. As much as any pitcher in baseball, Boyd could stand to benefit if the ball is less lively than it has been in recent seasons. More than ever, though, teams covet pitchers with swing-and-miss stuff. Between his four-seamer and slider, Boyd has a pair of bat-missing weapons.

With the Tigers yet to emerge from the rebuild the Price trade symbolically kicked off, Boyd himself could be on the move in the near future. Detroit didn’t actively look to trade him last offseason, but the club also seems unlikely to contend by 2022, his final season of team control. He’ll no doubt pique contending teams’ interest and would bring back a much stronger return than his ERA might otherwise suggest.

As for the Jays, their story has been told many times, although their fans may not mind hearing it once more. They stormed back in the second half, not only securing a playoff berth but erasing a seven-game deficit to win the AL East. Toronto knocked off the Rangers in the ALDS that year in one of the more memorable series in recent history. Their magical second-half run came to an end in the ALCS at the hands of the eventual World Series champion Royals. Price was instrumental to that success, tossing 74.1 innings of 2.30 ERA ball in the season’s final two months. He parlayed his longtime excellence into a seven year, $217MM deal with the Red Sox that offseason.

All told, the trade looks like a win for both sides. The Blue Jays got an elite two months from an ace to help propel them to a division title. The Tigers have gotten plenty of valuable innings over the longer term. Indeed, they got their high strikeout, mid-rotation southpaw out of the deal, even if it wasn’t the player anyone expected to it be.

One Trade The Rays Would Like To Have Back

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The Rays have a reputation for winning trades, with good reason. They’ve proven especially adept at picking up undervalued assets from other organizations. Just this month, MLBTR’s Connor Byrne has covered three key players on the current roster who were acquired either in minor deals or were seen as lesser-regarded players in a more notable swap.

There’s one prominent example, though, of a player whom the Rays gave up as a secondary piece in a bigger trade, only to watch blossom in his new surroundings: right-hander German Márquez. Even the smartest organizations have their share of misses.

At the time the Rays and Rockies completed their January 2016 four-player swap, it was generally seen as the Corey Dickerson–Jake McGee deal. Dickerson had put up fantastic offensive numbers in parts of three seasons in Colorado, hitting .299/.346/.532 (124 wRC+) with 38 home runs in 921 plate appearances. Even after adjusting for Coors Field, Dickerson looked like a fantastic hitter. There were questions about him defensively, but there was obvious appeal to adding a potential middle-of-the-order bat with four seasons of team control for Tampa Bay.

On the other side, the Rockies most visible acquisition was the final two arbitration seasons of McGee. He’d carved out a masterful run at the back end of the Rays’ bullpen in the four years prior. The Rockies envisioned a left-handed strikeout arm anchoring their relief corps. (That didn’t happen, as McGee has fallen off, particularly after signing an ill-fated three-year deal to return to Colorado as a free agent after 2017).

Despite McGee’s prior dominance, the deal seemed tilted in the Rays’ favor. Dave Cameron, then of Fangraphs, opined that the Dickerson-McGee framework “just doesn’t make any sense for the Rockies.” As MLBTR’s Steve Adams and Jeff Todd explained, “it’s somewhat surprising…the Rockies felt comfortable parting with four years of Dickerson for two years of a reliever, however excellent he may be, and one mid-level pitching prospect. Colorado, of course, may see considerably more in Marquez than others in the industry.” 

Maybe the Rockies were truly outliers in evaluating the then-20-year-old pitcher more favorably than the rest of the league. If they were, credit to them. Over the past four seasons, Márquez has handily been the most valuable player in the swap. He’s racked up between 10 and 12 wins above replacement despite not reaching the majors until that September. His curveball, merely projected to average as a prospect, has actually proven one of the better swing-and-miss offerings of its type leaguewide, per Brooks Baseball. Increased reliance on his slider in 2018 coincided with a second big uptick in his strikeout rate. Long an elite strike-thrower, Márquez now has bona fide swing-and-miss stuff to back it up. Colorado doubled down on their faith in him with a $43MM guarantee last spring that could keep Márquez around via club options through 2024.

On the other side, Dickerson was merely a good hitter over two years in Tampa, undone a bit by an aggressive approach. He hit .265/.310/.480 (109 wRC+) in 1177 plate appearances from 2016-17. With his arbitration costs rising, the Rays somewhat surprisingly shipped him to Pittsburgh for Daniel Hudson, whom they subsequently released, and second base prospect Tristan Gray. Both Gray and Kevin Padlo, the second player the Rockies sent to Tampa four years ago, remain in the system as decently-regarded prospects.

The Rays figure to recoup some long-term value from Padlo and Gray, but that’ll likely pale in comparison what Márquez has achieved in Colorado. He stands out as the one who got away for Tampa.

The Extension That Kept The Future World Series MVP In D.C.

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Four years ago today, the Nationals made a franchise-altering decision. The club and Stephen Strasburg agreed on a seven-year, $175MM extension (with deferrals that lowered its present value) on May 10, 2016. The deal kept the then-27-year-old from hitting free agency that winter, where he’d have profiled as the top player on the market in the eyes of MLBTR’s Tim Dierkes. It registered as a surprise given how close the former #1 overall pick was to the open market, made a bit more eye-opening by his status as a Scott Boras client.

Clearly, though, Strasburg was comfortable with the only organization he’d ever known. And the deal didn’t commit him to Washington for the full seven years; it came with opt-out clauses after 2019 and 2020. He’d have a chance to (and ultimately did) pitch his way to greater earnings in the future.

For the Nationals, the risk-reward calculus was apparent. The extension looked to be a discount relative to Strasburg’s overall earning potential, considering the $200MM+ guarantees secured by Max Scherzer and David Price the two prior offseasons. Still, committing well over nine figures to any pitcher, particularly one with a Tommy John Surgery under his belt, comes with potential pitfalls.

Over the first few seasons, the deal played as a fine one for the club, but it wasn’t any sort of massive bargain. Strasburg was very productive when healthy, combining for a 3.27 ERA/3.13 FIP in 404 innings from the time of signing through the end of 2018. Various injuries kept him just outside the game’s top tier of pitchers, though. In that two and a half year stretch, the right-hander hit the injured list five separate times with back, shoulder, elbow and neck maladies. None had ultimately proven serious, but he had assembled a somewhat ominous laundry list of health problems.

Entering 2019, it didn’t look as if Strasburg was on track to exercise the first of those opt-outs. Then, at age 30, he ripped off a career year. In the regular season, he tossed 209 innings (his first 200-inning season since 2014) of 3.32 ERA ball with stellar strikeout (29.8%), walk (6.7%) and ground-ball (51.1%) rates. That alone would’ve made his season a resounding success, but it was Strasburg’s October work that cemented his place in Nationals’ lore.

He kicked off the 2019 postseason with three scoreless relief innings behind Scherzer in the NL Wild Card game, allowing the Nats to rally late and knock off the Brewers. That was only the beginning. Strasburg would go on to start five playoff games thereafter. He tossed quality starts in all of them, and Washington would go on to win each one. He played a key role in three elimination game victories, including an 8.1 inning gem in Game 6 of the World Series in Houston. All told, he finished the postseason with a 1.98 ERA and an absurd 47:4 strikeout-to-walk ratio in 36.1 innings. He picked up a deserved World Series MVP award for his efforts in bringing the franchise’s first title to D.C.

Strasburg’s again back in the fold long-term. After opting out, he re-signed last winter on another seven-year deal for a $245MM guarantee. Regardless of how his next deal plays out, Strasburg will always have a spot in the heart of the Nationals’ faithful. That’s in large part thanks to the agreement the sides were able to put together four years ago.

How The Royals Acquired The AL Home Run Champ

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Two of last season’s top three home run hitters were originally acquired in trade. NL champ Pete Alonso was drafted and developed by the Mets, but NL runner up Eugenio Suárez and AL leader Jorge Soler were plucked from other organizations early in their MLB careers. MLBTR’s Connor Byrne just looked back at the Reds’ brilliant acquisition of Suárez. It only seems fair to give the Soler trade its due.

Soler was a known commodity long before he signed a pro contract. His name appeared on MLBTR pages more than thirty times before he finally agreed with the Cubs as a twenty-year old international amateur in 2012. He immediately found himself on top prospect lists and quickly tore through the minors, making his MLB debut a little over two years after signing.

Despite an exceptional debut, Soler never quite established himself amidst a crowded outfield mix on the North Side. In 765 cumulative plate appearances from 2014-16, he hit .258/.328/.434 (106 wRC+) with 27 home runs. It was passable production, but not enough to consistently crack a lineup with Dexter Fowler, Jason Heyward, Albert Almora, and Kyle Schwarber on hand, to say nothing of infielders like Kris Bryant and Ben Zobrist capable of manning the grass. Even with Fowler departing as a free agent, the Cubs’ outfield looked like an area of surplus. (It hasn’t really borne out that way, but it looked like a strong group at the time). That made Soler a reasonable trade candidate for a team looking to defend a World Series title.

That offseason, the Cubs and Royals indeed lined up on a deal. With their own competitive window soon to close, K.C. acquired the 24-year-old slugger for contract-year reliever Wade Davis. It was perfectly understandable from the Chicago organization’s perspective. Aroldis Chapman was to sign elsewhere just a day later. The bullpen looked like the relative weak spot on a win-now club. As MLBTR’s Steve Adams pointed out at the time of the deal, Davis had some red flags (injuries and a slight velocity loss), but he was fresh off an utterly dominant three-year run in Kansas City.

Indeed, the Cubs mostly got what they bargained for from Davis. He did regress a bit in 2017, as Steve suggested he might. But Davis was still quite good in Chicago, working to a 2.30 ERA/3.38 FIP in 58.2 innings. The Cubs lost to the Dodgers in the NLCS, but that was the fault of their offense, not Davis. The right-hander has fallen apart since signing with the Rockies after that 2017 season, but the immediate returns on the deal were positive for the Cubs. That wasn’t the case for the Royals.

Soler spent the first month of that season on the injured list with a strained oblique. When he returned in May, he was dreadful, hitting .164/.292/.273 and earning a demotion to Triple-A. Soler did hit well in the minors, but 2017 was undoubtedly a disappointment. He seemed to reestablish himself in 2018, hitting well until suffering a season-ending toe fracture in June. Everything clicked in 2019, though.

Most importantly, Soler stayed healthy last season, playing in all 162 games. He increased his hard contact rate to a career-high 46.7% and dropped his infield fly ball rate to a career-low 8.8%. He made the most contact of his career and continued to draw walks at a hefty clip (10.8%). All told, Soler’s .265/.354/.569 slash (136 wRC+) placed him in the top 20 qualified hitters leaguewide. Even at pitcher-friendly Kauffman Stadium, Soler paced the Junior Circuit in home runs with 48. Statcast data supported the breakout, as Soler finished in the 95th percentile or better in average exit velocity, hard contact rate and expected weighted on-base average. Even as a mediocre defensive outfielder who’s best suited for DH work, that’s plenty productive. Soler was worth nearly four wins above replacement last season, per both Fangraphs and Baseball Reference.

The Royals are no doubt thrilled with the acquisition of Soler at this point. He’s finally emerged as the middle-of-the-order force many expected. Steve Adams explored the possibility of the sides lining up on an extension in September. Controlled through 2021, Soler could alternatively be a key trade chip for the rebuilding club if the sides can’t reach a long-term agreement.

When Trusting The Decline Phase Goes Wrong: The Reds’ Decision To Trade Frank Robinson

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Let’s begin this look back at perhaps the most famous (or infamous) age-related trade in baseball history with a simple point: the decline phase is real.  Both analytical data and just plain common sense dictates that players become less productive as they get older, and this logic has been the backbone of countless transactions over the decades.  We see several examples every year of teams being willing to invest in younger free agents, or being willing to give up more in a trade for a younger player (who, in most cases, also comes with more years of team control), while also being less willing to surrender trade assets or big free agent dollars for players in their 30’s, out of a fear that those players might quickly hit the wall.

So in this sense, Reds owner/GM Bill DeWitt wasn’t entirely off the mark by deciding to trade Frank Robinson to the Orioles for a three-player package back on December 9, 1965.  It’s always better to move a player a year too early than a year too late, and since Baltimore was willing to give up a promising 26-year-old right-hander in Milt Pappas as the headliner of the trade return, DeWitt felt it was a swap worth making.

Pappas was coming off an All-Star season in 1965, the second time the Detroit native had been named to the Midsummer Classic in a four-season span.  Despite his still-young age, Pappas was already a veteran of nine MLB seasons, with an impressive 3.24 ERA (113 ERA+) to show for his 1632 career innings.  He was the type of arm that seemingly promised an immediate rotation upgrade, and the inclusion of veteran righty reliever Jack Baldschun only made the deal more tempting for the Reds.  Cincinnati pitchers had a cumulative 3.88 ERA in 1965, ranking the Reds 16th out of the 20 Major League teams.

And thus, the O’s sent Pappas, Baldschun, and 21-year-old outfielder Dick Simpson to Cincinnati for Robinson.  It was a classic pitching-for-hitting type of swap that saw both teams deal from a surplus in order to address a need, and on paper, the trade made some sense.

On paper.

In practice, no discussion of baseball’s most lopsided deals is complete without mention of this trade, which ended up sparking a golden age of Orioles baseball.  The thing about baseball’s aging curve is that those who can defy it tend to defy it in a very big way — great players are defined, after all, by sustaining that greatness over an extended period of time.  Any player can have one big season or even several big seasons, but those who can keep that production up across the decades are the ones that truly stand out as all-time legends.

Case in point, Frank Robinson, who was a superstar from essentially day one.  Robinson won NL Rookie Of The Year honors in 1956 and also finished seventh in NL MVP voting in his first season, kicking off a dominant ten-year run in Cincinnati.  Over 1502 games and 6408 plate appearances from 1956-65, Robinson hit .303/.389/.554 with 324 home runs, making eight All-Star appearances and winning the NL MVP Award in 1961 (a year that saw the Reds win the NL pennant).

There wasn’t much evidence that Robinson was slowing down in 1965, though the slugger did turn 30 years old that August.  This detail is maybe the key factor in why this trade is so memorable over 54 years later.  Asked why he dealt one of baseball’s best hitters, DeWitt described Robinson as either “an old 30” or “not a young 30,” depending on the source.

Naturally, trading Frank Robinson for any reason wouldn’t have been a fond memory for Reds fans regardless of the specific details.  But DeWitt’s mention of Robinson’s age created an easy hook for both the media and maybe even for Robinson himself, who by all accounts was very motivated to prove that the Reds erred in trading him.

That motivation led to Robinson’s 1966 campaign, one of more wall-to-wall dominant seasons any player has ever enjoyed.  Robinson won the Triple Crown (49 homers, 122 RBI, .316 average) while also leading the AL in runs (122), OBP (.410) and slugging percentage (.637) for good measure.  He proceeded to post a 1.232 OPS in the World Series, leading to Series MVP honors as the Orioles won the first World Series championship in franchise history.  As you might expect, Robinson was named AL MVP, making him the first and still only player to ever win MVP honors in both the American and National Leagues.

Robinson hit .301/.401/.543 with 179 homers over his six seasons in Baltimore.  This was good for a 169 OPS+, which topped his 150 OPS+ during his previous decade in a Reds uniform.  The Orioles reached the World Series four times in Robinson’s six years on the roster, winning another championship in 1970.  Ultimately, Robinson didn’t start to slow down at the plate until 1976, his 21st and final season.

As any Reds fan can sadly recount, Cincinnati’s end of the trade didn’t work out nearly as well.  Baldschun and Simpson didn’t contribute much over two seasons with the Reds and both didn’t play in the majors after 1970.  While Pappas only posted a 4.04 ERA over 490 innings for the Reds before being dealt to the Braves in June 1968, it’s unfair to label him as a bust — it’s just that anything short of Cy Young-level performance would have paled in comparison to Robinson’s Orioles dominance.  Pappas went on to pitch eight more seasons in the big leagues, with a 3.57 ERA that represented only a relatively minor step back from his heyday in Baltimore.

The Reds struggled to a 76-84 record in 1966, and DeWitt both stepped down from the GM role and sold the club during the offseason.  Though DeWitt had a long career as an executive that included two pennant winners (the 1961 Reds and the 1944 St. Louis Browns — ironically, the franchise that would later become the Orioles), the Robinson trade is the move that DeWitt is most remembered for today, in large part because of his “not a young 30” quote.

The deal has become maybe the all-time cautionary tale for any team thinking about moving an aging but still-productive star.  Though there are far more examples of teams either correctly parting ways with a player before their eventual decline, or (by contrast) hanging onto a star player too long and watching him decline on their watch, no GM wants to be the one responsible for trading away a legend.  Father Time may not undefeated, as the saying goes, though Robinson put up as good of a battle against the aging curve as any just about any player in any sport.

Transaction Retrospection: The Rocky Colavito/Harvey Kuenn Blockbuster

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Pop quiz, who were the AL and NL batting champions last season?

If you didn’t immediately have the names of Tim Anderson (.335) and Christian Yelich (.329) at the tip of your tongue, don’t worry.  Given how modern statistics have lessened the importance of batting average in recent years, the batting title doesn’t carry nearly as much prestige in 2019 as it did for much of baseball’s history.  One could even make the case that the home run crown lost some its luster last year since so many players were suddenly clearing the fences — a record 6776 homers were hit during the 2019 season, with Pete Alonso (53) and Jorge Soler (48) leading the way in their respective leagues.

All this being said, you can imagine the furor that would have been generated this offseason if a Yelich-for-Alonso deal had been arranged between the Brewers and Mets, or if the White Sox and Royals decided to swap Soler and Anderson in a one-for-one deal.  Ultimately, any straight-up trade of star players is going to generate headlines, though the idea of a “home run champ for batting champ” trade makes for just as intriguing a concept today as it did 60 years ago yesterday, when the Indians dealt Rocky Colavito to the Tigers for Harvey Kuenn.

Both players were All-Stars in 1959, with Colavito finishing fourth in AL MVP voting and Kuenn in eighth place.  Colavito’s 42 home runs tied Harmon Killebrew for the American League lead, as “The Rock” managed to top his 41-homer performance from a season earlier.  Over four full seasons with the Tribe, Colavito has already hit 129 home runs and slashed .271/.364/.533 over 2166 plate appearances, making him an instant superstar to the Cleveland faithful.

However, Colavito hit “only” .257 in 1959, which led Indians GM Frank Lane to balk at Colavito’s demand for a raise for the 1960 season.  For younger fans used to today’s guaranteed contracts and arbitration structure, players in 1960 had to negotiate their salaries on a year-to-year basis, and since teams had total control over player movement due to the reserve clause, even some of the game’s biggest stars had little leverage in salary negotiations.  In fact, there was also some dispute between Kuenn and the Tigers in the batting champ’s own contract talks heading into the 1960 season.

Though Colavito and the Indians ultimately worked out a deal for 1960, Lane (known as “Trader Frank” for completing over 400 swaps during his two decades as a GM for five different teams) jumped at the opportunity to move the slugger for a player Lane felt was a better all-around talent.  While Kuenn’s reputation has been somewhat diminished by his decline after this trade, it should be noted that he was a very good ballplayer in his prime.  From 1953-59, Kuenn hit .314/.360/.426 with 53 home runs, while leading the league in hits four times, doubles three times, and once in batting average thanks to his career-best .353 mark in 1959.

As steady as Kuenn was, however, 1959 was by far his best offensive year, and it was still only somewhat better (141 OPS+, 145 wRC+) than Colavito’s production (133 OPS+, 130 wRC+) that same season.  Kuenn was also almost three years older than Colavito, and of course didn’t have Colavito’s folk hero status in Cleveland.  Indians fans were instantly enraged by the trade, while Lane was confident that he had made a shrewd move.  In an infamous quote that has gone down in Tribe lore, Lane told reporters that dealing Colavito for Kuenn was like trading hamburger for steak.

In 1960, it seemed like the Indians may have at least broken even on the deal.  Kuenn hit .308/.379/.416 over 537 PA, good for a 118 OPS+ and wRC+ through modern analytical eyes.  Colavito, meanwhile, far outpaced Kuenn in the power department by hitting 35 homers and collecting 87 RBI over 616 PA, but also batted .249/.317/.474 (107 wRC+, 108 OPS+) in his first season in Detroit.

It didn’t take long for Trader Frank to lose interest in Kuenn, however, as Kuenn was traded to the Giants in the 1960-61 offseason for left-hander Johnny Antonelli and outfielder Willie Kirkland.  Antonelli’s MLB career ended after the 1961 season, while Kirkland put up some decent power numbers along with a low average (ironically, making him something of the version of Colavito that Lane feared Colavito would become).  Kuenn played six more years in the big leagues and had a couple more productive seasons, though he never again approached his 1959 peak.

As for Colavito, he rebounded from his 1960 down year to become one of the game’s most fearsome bats of the 1960’s, hitting .266/.362/.470 with 210 home runs from 1961-68 despite playing in a notoriously pitcher-friendly era.  This included a second stint in Cleveland in 1965-67, as the Indians (with Lane no longer in the organization) reacquired Colavito for a return visit.

Cleveland fans may already be cringing at any recollection of “The Curse Of Rocky Colavito,” which was the title of a 1994 book by longtime Cleveland sportswriter Terry Pluto.  After dealing Colavito, the Indians didn’t reach the postseason again until the 1995 season, and the club had only six winning seasons between 1960-1993.  The Colavito trade was hardly the only reason for the Indians’ long slide, of course, and it arguably wasn’t even the starting point of the team’s downfall — nor was it even the most damaging trade the Indians made with the Tigers that same week.  Just five days prior to the Colavito deal, Cleveland sent Norm Cash to Detroit for infielder Steve Demeter, who went on to appear in just four games for the Tribe and never again played in the majors after the 1960 season.  Cash, meanwhile, proceeded to rip up American League pitching for the next 15 years in a Tigers uniform.

Still, the Cash trade never seemed to loom as large in the minds of Tribe supporters, perhaps since Cash never actually played a game in a Cleveland uniform.  (The Indians acquired Cash from the White Sox as part of a seven-player deal that saw Minnie Minoso head back to Chicago earlier in the 1959-60 offseason.)  Colavito had already become a fan favorite at the time of the deal, and continued to remain a presence in Cleveland for years afterwards, both in his return stint as a player and then as a coach and broadcaster for the Indians.

Trading one star player for another was as relatively unusual in 1960 and it would be today, though in some ways, the story of Colavito-for-Kuenn has a lot of parallels to modern-day front office moves.  Money was naturally a factor, as both Colavito and Kuenn were coming off rather contentious contract negotiations, and it seemed as though Lane had misgivings about continuing to pay top dollar for what he felt was a power-only type of ballplayer.

In today’s game, you might see a front office just non-tender an arbitration-eligible slugger rather than work out a trade — just ask Chris Carter or C.J. Cron.  Likewise, many a current GM would undoubtedly prefer more of a well-rounded hitter than a power-only type, though of course Lane was far off the mark both in evaluating Colavito as a one-dimensional hitter, and in betting that Kuenn would continue his 1959 form.

Losing Colavito was a tough beat for Indians fans, though since the Tribe have been regular postseason participants since Pluto’s book was published, maybe the “curse” is technically no more.  Of course, Cleveland also hasn’t won a World Series since 1948 (the longest streak of any team in baseball), so maybe the baseball gods have more of an issue with the Tribe than just the Colavito deal.  Maybe fate simply prefers hamburger to steak.

Transaction Retrospection: A Washington-Oakland Blockbuster

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It has been almost three full years since the Nationals and Athletics swung a noteworthy trade that has already made a big impact and could continue to have a sizable effect in the coming seasons. Leading up to the July 2017 trade deadline, the Nationals acquired relievers Sean Doolittle and Ryan Madson in exchange for fellow reliever Blake Treinen and a pair of prospects in left-hander Jesus Luzardo and third baseman Sheldon Neuse.

It was a bold strike for the Nationals, then way ahead of their competition in the NL East but aiming to patch up a poor bullpen. Doolittle and Madson did indeed continue to put up stellar numbers after the trade, helping the Nationals to a division title. The Nats then bowed out of the playoffs in the NLDS with a five-game defeat at the hands of the Cubs, though Doolittle and Madson were effective in that series.

Unfortunately for Washington, the 2017 campaign was the last good one of Madson’s career. He pitched to a 5.28 ERA over 44 1/3 innings in their uniform in 2018 – a non-playoff effort for the team. With the Nationals mired in mediocrity in late August of that year, they traded him to the Dodgers for righty Andrew Istler. Madson’s struggles continued in LA, and he hasn’t pitched since.

Doolittle, on the other hand, remains a valuable member of Washington’s roster. The southpaw has logged a stingy 2.87 ERA with 10.47 K/9, 1.93 BB/9 and 75 saves in 83 chances across 135 innings in a Nationals uniform. The 33-year-old’s regular-season output in 2019 was somewhat underwhelming, but he made up for it by serving as an instrumental piece in helping the franchise to its first-ever World Series title in the fall. Doolittle combined for 10 1/3 frames of two-run ball in series wins over the Dodgers, Cardinals and Astros. He’ll be a National for at least one more season (if there is one), as they picked up his $6.5MM club option after last year.

Flags fly forever, so in light of Doolittle’s contributions, the Nationals would probably make this trade again. The same goes for the Athletics. Sure, Madson and Doolittle impressed when they were part of the club, but the A’s have benefited quite a bit from selling high on those two. The A’s weren’t in contention when the trade went down, and nor did they make the playoffs that year, but Treinen helped key a postseason return in 2018 with one of the greatest campaigns a reliever has ever put forth. He recorded a ridiculous 0.78 ERA with 38 saves, thereby aiding in a 97-win season for the A’s. They posted the same record en route to another postseason berth last year, though Treinen’s production fell off a cliff, and he lost his job as their closer as a result. He’s now a member of the Dodgers after the A’s non-tendered him over the winter.

While Treinen’s success in Oakland was fleeting, the team could profit from Luzardo’s presence for a long time. Nineteen years old when the trade occurred, Luzardo entered 2017 as Baseball America’s 15th-best Nationals prospect. He’s now one of the premier prospects in all of baseball (BA ranks him ninth) and someone with front-of-the-rotation upside. For Luzardo to realize that potential, though, he’ll have to stay healthy.

Luzardo’s a former Tommy John surgery patient who missed most of last season with rotator cuff and lat troubles, but the results were scintillating when he was able to pitch. He made his major league debut late in the year out of the A’s bullpen and proceeded to fire 12 innings of two-run ball with 16 strikeouts, three walks and just five hits given up. The A’s will obviously hope for that dominance to carry over when he joins their rotation.

Neuse, 25, is not an elite farmhand, but there’s still hope for him to amount to something in the bigs. He had difficulty over his first 61 MLB plate appearances last year, though he was terrific in Triple-A ball, where he batted .317/.389/.550 (126 wRC+) with 27 home runs in 560 PA. MLB.com is bullish on Neuse, rating him sixth in the A’s system and writing that he “could be a big league regular in another organization, but for now looks like a very solid super-utility type whose bat will force its way into the lineup more often than not.”

Assessing this trade now, it looks like a win-win. The Nationals would love to have Luzardo vying for a spot in their already stacked rotation, and they probably wouldn’t mind having Neuse around to push for playing time. But you can’t take away the championship Doolittle helped them win. On the other side, the A’s received an unforgettable season from Treinen and could have one or two long-term contributors in Luzardo and Neuse.

Photos courtesy of USA Today Sports Images.

Revisiting The Ozzie Albies Extension

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Today marks the one-year anniversary of a deal that looks like it’ll pay dividends for years to come. On April 11, 2019, the Braves and second baseman Ozzie Albies agreed on an extension that could keep the dynamic switch-hitter in Atlanta through 2027.

Albies, who was under team control through 2023 prior to the deal, received a $1MM salary in 2019. He’ll match that this season, take home $3MM in 2021, $5MM in 2022, and $7MM apiece from 2023-25. The Braves hold a pair of $7MM club options (the first with a $4MM buyout) for the 2026 and 2027 seasons. All told, the deal guaranteed Albies just $35MM with a maximum payout of $45MM over nine seasons.

Even at the time, those were shockingly low numbers for a player of Albies’ promise. The former top prospect had compiled a .272/.323/.456 line (107 wRC+) through his first 977 MLB plate appearances. Combined with strong baserunning and keystone defense, Albies had amassed upwards of five wins above replacement before his 22nd birthday.

As MLBTR’s Steve Adams wrote at the time, the deal looked exceptionally lopsided in the club’s favor:

“Frankly, this seems like the type of deal that an agent would strongly advise his client not to take. Perhaps Albies simply wanted to take the largest guarantee the Braves were willing to offer; he received just a $350K signing bonus as a prospect, after all, and his career earnings to date may not even total seven figures. From a purely human standpoint, it’s hard for any 22-year-old player without much in the way of career earnings to rebuff $35MM under the guise that he’ll earn more on a year-to-year basis beginning 24 months down the line. Presumably, all of the points made here were spelled out to Albies before he made what amounts to a life-altering decision.”

While the deal already looked like a coup for the club, Albies took his game to another level in 2019. He played in 160 games and hit .295/.352/.500 (117 wRC+) with an NL-best 189 hits. That was enough to earn him the Silver Slugger among NL second baseman. There could’ve also been an argument for him to win a Gold Glove (although Kolten Wong was no doubt a deserving winner). Albies racked up eleven defensive runs saved in 2019, bringing him to 28 runs above-average for his career by that metric. All told, he was worth about five wins above replacement, per both Fangraphs and Baseball Reference.

That marked a welcome step forward from Albies’ previous level of production at the plate. But it was hardly out-of-the-blue. He’d long shown the talent to be a plus hitter with strong contributions as a baserunner and defender. He faded offensively down the stretch in 2018, but it was reasonable to project further growth with reps against MLB pitching and physical maturation.

For the Braves, the Albies extension (as well as the one signed by Ronald Acuña, Jr.) looks like a slam dunk. It’s hard to give the Alex Anthopoulos-led front office too much credit; every team in baseball presumably would’ve signed up for the same deal if given the opportunity, even after Albies’ late-2018 swoon. This wasn’t a front office taking a gamble on an unknown, unheralded player they loved. The consensus was Albies was a high-level talent. Indeed, as Steve explored at the time, a $50MM guarantee would have been more in line with deals signed by comparable players in the 1+ service class, including Christian Yelich and Andrelton Simmons. Some commentators (including Jon Tayler, then at Sports Illustrated, and Michael Baumann of the Ringer) even questioned the team’s ethics in offering the deal.

Albies, of course, was well within his right to value the upfront multi-million dollar guarantee. He hasn’t expressed any public regret since. Yet the extension arguably looks even more team-friendly now than it did at the time. Not only did Albies post a career year in 2019, last offseason’s free agent market was much stronger than the previous two. Whether the abnormally quiet markets of 2017-18 and 2018-19 impacted Albies’ decision isn’t clear, but they no doubt played a role in the high volume of spring 2019 extensions signed leaguewide. (Admittedly, it’s unclear precisely how future markets will respond to lost revenue related to the coronavirus-forced hiatus).

Albies figures to be penciled into Atlanta’s lineup at minimal rates for the next eight years. It’s plausible to project even more offense as he enters his mid-20’s, particularly if he can rein in his plate discipline a bit. Even if he’s already reached his peak, he’d be among MLB’s biggest bargains. He and Acuña should comprise one of the game’s most formidable one-two punches for a good chunk of the next decade.

Revisiting The Nats’ “Steal” Of A Deal

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Back in the 2013-14 offseason, the Tigers were looking to move a veteran starter … but not because they were in a rebuild. The club had taken three consecutive AL Central titles (and would add another in the ensuing campaign).

The issue was quite the opposite: with Justin Verlander, Max Scherzer, Doug Fister, Rick Porcello, Anibal Sanchez, and Drew Smyly all on the staff, the Detroit organization felt it had depth to spare. Looking ahead at the cost to retain the team’s stars — they ultimately failed to reach a deal with Scherzer but inked a monster extension with Miguel Cabrera later that offseason — the decision was made to trim some costs where possible and bring back some long-range talent.

Meanwhile, the Nationals were in search of a quality arm to plug into would land Fister in a swap that sent a largely underwhelming three-player package back to the Tigers. Utilityman Steve Lombardozzi and lefty reliever Ian Krol were each young players with MLB experience but little in the way of apparent ceiling. The Tigers hoped that they’d be affordable contributors, but neither carved out a career in Detroit. The most interesting long-term piece was a notable but not overly heralded lefty pitching prospect by the name of Robbie Ray.

This wasn’t quite how the Tigers wanted talks to play out. The club reportedly wanted a different young hurler to headline the deal: Taylor Jordan, who had emerged out of obscurity in 2013. Jordan utilized his decidedly Fister-esque skillset to compile 51 2/3 innings of 3.66 ERA work in 2013, averaging just 5.1 K/9 but limiting the walks (1.9 BB/9) and homers (0.52 HR/9) while generating lots of groundballs (57.5%). It seemed Jordan might well be a long-term rotation piece, even if it was unlikely he’d ever really dominate.

Ray, a 22-year-old former 12th-round pick, hadn’t yet reached the highest level of the minors, let alone the bigs. But he was perhaps a higher-ceiling young hurler than Jordan. In 2013, Ray worked to a 3.68 cumulative ERA over 142 frames at the High-A and Double-A levels while racking up 10.1 K/9 against 3.9 BB/9.

For good reason, the Nationals were widely lauded for their acquisition. I characterized the deal as a value-laden, well-timed strike. Dave Cameron of Fangraphs said the Nats had paid “a shockingly low price, considering that Fister is one of the game’s most underrated pitchers.” While anything but flashy, the tall right-hander had a nice track record of high-quality rotation work — over 800 frames of 3.53 ERA ball — and came with two seasons of remaining arbitration control. The thievery metaphor was popular, beginning with the title of Cameron’s post. Plenty of people termed the swap a “steal,” especially after Fister turned in an outstanding 2014 campaign.

There’s no discounting Fister’s excellence in his first year in D.C. Though he missed some action, he still managed to spin 164 innings of 2.41 ERA ball. But as it turned out, that would be the last truly productive campaign of his career. Fister struggled with a lat injury at the start of the ensuing campaign and never really got going. He did manage a useful 4.19 ERA in 103 frames in 2015, so it was hardly a minimal contribution, but the peripherals didn’t support the results and the output didn’t account for his final arbitration salary of $11.4MM. Any thoughts of recouping draft compensation by issuing a qualifying offer went right out the window.

On the other side of the swap … well, the Tigers didn’t quite get what they hoped for either, but they only had their own ensuing actions to blame. After watching Ray struggle in a brief 2014 debut, Detroit ended up sending him out in a memorable three-team trade that really didn’t work out for the Motown side. That deal, which also cost the Tigers a decent infield prospect in Domingo Leyba, returned righty Shane Greene. While he had his moments in Detroit, they came after he transitioned to a relief role. Greene was swapped out last summer. The arrangement would have gone better had the Tigers simply taken shortstop Didi Gregorius, who ended up with the Yankees.

By that point, Ray was ready for a full test at the MLB level. He turned in a very strong debut in 2015. And while the results have taken a bit of a rollercoaster ride since, he has produced huge strikeout numbers and generally fared well in the eyes of advanced metrics. Ray has contributed 762 innings of 3.96 ERA ball in Arizona while racking up 11.3 K/9 against 4.1 BB/9. The long ball has been an issue, but it hasn’t stopped him from compiling 10 rWAR and a dozen fWAR — well over twice what Fister ended up providing to the Nats (4.5 rWAR / 1.7 fWAR) — in advance of his final season of arbitration eligibility.

Photos courtesy of USA Today Sports Images.

Mike Clevinger: The One That Got Away From The Halos

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The post-trade-deadline trades of yore can’t happen anymore under baseball’s current rules. That’s a shame in some respects, because the August revocable waiver trade period delivered some doozies over the years. Here’s a story about one of them …

Back in 2014, the Angels were sprinting towards an AL West title and looking to bolster their bullpen. GM Jerry Dipoto had already swung a series of deals: he acquired closer Huston Street, nabbed lefty setup man Joe Thatcher, made a memorable change of scenery deal to get Jason Grilli for Ernesto Frieri, and even took a flier on Rich Hill (who never contributed in Anaheim).

The Street swap — the biggest of these moves — took place two weeks before the trade deadline. Dipoto was understandably still itching to improve a talented roster and ensure that the team was fully loaded for the postseason when an interesting opportunity arose in early August …

Vinnie Pestano

Vinnie Pestano was on the outs with the Indians. He was excellent in 2011 and 2012 but had stumbled in the ensuing two seasons. Still, a glance at his 2014 numbers shows why the Halos perked up when they saw his name scroll across the waiver wire.

Pestano, then 29, had a 13:1 K/BB ratio in nine MLB innings that year — even if he also allowed five earned runs. And in his 30 1/3 Triple-A frames, he owned a 1.78 ERA with 37 strikeouts against a dozen walks. It didn’t hurt that Pestano was earning just $975K and could be controlled through 2017.

The Indians hadn’t put Pestano on revocable waivers with intentions of letting him go for nothing. When the Angels were awarded the claim, they had to work out a deal to bring Pestano over from Cleveland.

It turned out that Dipoto had managed to make the above-noted additions without sacrificing any prospects who ended up turning out to be big losses over the long haul. That wasn’t so with the Pestano move, which cost a little-known prospect by the name of Mike Clevinger.

Mike Clevinger | Geoff Burke-USA TODAY Sports

At the time, the 2011 fourth-rounder was on the radar but hardly an elite prospect. He was still in the middle of his first full professional season, having been sidelined for much of 2012-13 owing to Tommy John surgery. And though he had shown quite well at the Class A level to open the 2014 campaign, Clevinger had only managed a 5.37 ERA over his 55 1/3 High-A frames.

Clevinger didn’t exactly hit the ground running with the Cleveland organization, as he struggled through just five more High-A appearances after arriving. He really popped in 2015, when he punished Double-A hitters to the tune of a 2.73 ERA in 158 innings. Still, as the 2016 season approached, the idea of a Jacob deGrom career path was mostly floated because the two hurlers both feature flowing locks.

While he wasn’t then and never would be a top-100 sort of prospect, that was also true of deGrom. And as it turned out, Clevinger has tracked a lot more closely to the Mets star than anyone could’ve seriously predicted.

Clevinger went through some rookie struggles but produced very good results in 2017 and 2018. Last year, he took an ace turn. Though he missed a significant stretch owing to a teres major muscle strain, Clevinger produced monster numbers when healthy. Over 126 innings, he worked to a 2.71 ERA with 12.1 K/9 against 2.6 BB/9.

While he suffered some more poor fortune with a meniscus tear this spring, that’s likely not to impact the future (particularly since he’s rehabbing while the season is on hold). Suffice to say that Clevinger is one of the game’s more valuable pitching commodities, as he’s just entering his first of three arbitration-eligible seasons. (He’ll earn $4.1MM.)

Ironically enough, the Angels showed trade interest in Clevinger this spring … with the Indians reportedly responding by asking about elite prospect Jo Adell. The Halos would surely rather not have traded him away in the first place. Pestano did make a dozen strong appearances down the stretch in 2014, with two more in the team’s unsuccessful ALDS appearance, but he washed out in 2015 and hasn’t been seen in the majors since. It’s yet another reminder that sometimes those under-the-radar deals end up being quite important over the long haul.

Photos courtesy of USA Today Sports Images.

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