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The Most Stacked Lineup Of The Millennium Missed The Playoffs

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With MVPs Cody Bellinger and Mookie Betts sharing a lineup with thumpers like Justin Turner, Max Muncy, and Corey Seager, the Los Angeles Dodgers lineup is stacked. That’s five players who have proved capable of posting 5-6 WAR seasons. We can even include A.J. Pollock in that group (6.8 fWAR in 2015) if we’re being generous – though it would open some eyes to see Pollack produce at that level again (even for a 60-game span). The ceiling hasn’t been set on youngsters like Will Smith and Gavin Lux, who could very well enter that elite territory with a best-case development future. There’s no denying that the Dodgers have a loaded lineup – but has there been a more MVP-loaded lineup in recent history?

The most stacked lineup of the last twenty years belongs to an 85-win, 3rd place St. Louis Cardinals team from 2003. “Most-stacked,” of course, isn’t exactly an official metric, so let me define it. Fangraphs explains fWAR in their glossary by classifying a “good player” as worth 3-4 fWAR, an “All-Star” to be worth 4-5 fWAR, and a “superstar” as worth 5-6 fWAR. But for the “most-stacked” lineup, we want the cream of the crop. Fangraphs classifies MVPs as those worth 6+ fWAR in a given season, so I went looking for the lineup with the most “MVPs”, and I found the unequivocal champ with the 2003 St. Louis Cardinals.

Not only did the Cardinals carry four MVP-caliber bats that season, but they’re the only team since 2000 to accomplish that feat. There have been four other teams since 2000 with three bats in the lineup worth 6+ fWAR (2004 Orioles, 2003 Braves, 2004 Cardinals, 2011 Red Sox) – but only Tony La Russa’s Cardinals fielded a quartet of such players.

Albert Pujols (9.5 fWAR), Jim Edmonds (6.3 fWAR), Edgar Renteria (6.3 fWAR), and Scott Rolen (6.2 fWAR) each put up an “MVP-like” seasons in 2003. The 23-year-old Pujols would have been a shoo-in to snag the actual NL MVP, but that was the era of supernova Barry Bonds, who won his third of four consecutive MVPs (10.2 fWAR) that season. 

The Cardinals finished 5th in the majors in runs scored with 876, second in total fWAR on offense, fourth in wRC+. J.D. Drew, Tino Martinez, and Bo Hart were productive members of the lineup, So Taguchi gave them 59 plate appearances with a 109 wRC+, and Eduardo Perez (122 wRC+) was a successful power bat off the bench. Only at catcher did they really struggle offensively, where Mike Matheny hit .252/.320/.356 to total 0.4 fWAR while starting 121 games behind the dish. In short, the offense did its part. 

Unfortunately, the entirety of the Cardinals pitching staff mustered just 7.3 fWAR. They finished 19th in ERA, 22nd in FIP, and 26th in home runs per nine innings. The bullpen was a particular disaster, finishing the season dead last in the majors with -1.8 fWAR. The rotation boasted legitimate arms in Woody Williams, Matt Morris, and less so, Brett Tomko. Dan Haren made an okay major league debut with 14 starts and a 5.08 ERA/4.57 FIP. 

That said, they could have done without the 55 starts from Garrett Stephenson, in what would be his last dash as an MLB hurler, Sterling Hitchcock in his second-to-last season, 40-year-old Jeff Fassero, and Jason Simontacchi, who was coming off a surprisingly decent rookie season at age-28. 

Giving 34 percent of their starts to suboptimal contributors didn’t pave the runway for the bullpen to take flight, but the relief crew struggled all their own. In particular, the main culprits were (again) Fassero (56 games, 6.52 ERA/6.13 FIP), Dustin Hermanson (23 games, 5.46 ERA/5.49 FIP), Russ Springer (17 games, 8.31 ERA/8.97 FIP), and Esteban Yan (39 games, 6.02 ERA/5.59 FIP). It didn’t help that injuries limited closer Jason Isringhausen to 40 games and 22 saves. He would otherwise anchor the Cardinals’ bullpens of that era. 

The 2003 Cardinals paint a picture of the difficulties in team-building. Four monster seasons making up half their everyday lineup, and still the Cardinals only managed to eke out a third-place finish. They underperformed their Pythagorean record, but only by three wins. The Cubs won the division with exactly 88 wins, overperforming their Pythagorean record by – you guessed it – three wins.

Things can go right – so right – in any given season, and it still might not be enough to counterbalance what goes wrong. That’s not to say that the 2020 Dodgers are in trouble – but their spot in the postseason is hardly assured. The ’03 Cardinals had the most MVP-level bats of any team in the past 20 years, and yet it was only enough for 85 wins. The margin for error will only be smaller in a short season.

Of course, here’s the other funny little part of baseball. Pujols/Rolen/Edmonds/Renteria couldn’t power their way to the postseason in 2003, but the foundation in St. Louis was solid. They did reach the postseason in 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006. La Russa’s Cardinals capped off the run with a World Series title. That season, they finished with 83 wins, one less than the “disappointment” their stacked lineup produced in 2003.

So the most-stacked lineup of the millennium missed the playoffs, and the “worst” division winner of the millennium won the World Series. If that’s not a good primer for the chaos to come in a short season, I don’t know what is. 

Explaining The 2020 MLB Roster Rules

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Major League Baseball is days away from a rapid-fire Summer Training, which will set the stage for a mad 60-game dash for postseason position, followed by a typically wild October … all while trying to manage the many challenges posed by the still-raging pandemic that disrupted the 2020 season in the first place. Sounds like a lot when you put it that way.

As one might expect, the typical roster rules for a MLB season would not work well in this scenario. Among other things, there’s a need for an actively engaged reserve corps of players with the minor-league season still on ice. Teams need a way to protect players who are injured or who contract COVID-19. The issue is all the more pressing in the early stages of the season.

MLBTR has learned and clarified many of the key details regarding the new roster rules. Here’s how things will work for the 2020 campaign:

  • Each team can establish a maximum 60-man player pool, with the initial list due by Sunday at 3pm CST. Teams are not required to fill all sixty slots.
  • No other players will be permitted to participate in camp. Teams are permitted to operate two separate camps if they so choose. All teams will operate an alternative training site once the season begins.
  • Players on the 40-man roster need not be included in the 60-man player pool. Likewise, of course, pool players need not be on the 40-man roster — unless and until they are added to the active MLB roster.
  • If a player is removed from a 60-man player pool, he cannot be added back to that team’s pool but can be added to another team’s pool. Players cannot be freely removed from the 60-man player pool without roster implications. Put otherwise: other than injured list placement, suspension, and some other infrequent designations, teams will be forced to surrender (or risk surrendering) control over a player (trade, release, DFA, outright, etc.) to remove him from the 60-man player pool.
  • Teams may otherwise add already controlled or newly acquired players to their 60-man player pool. Players can be signed to the 60-man player pool without being added to the 40-man roster, but that requires 60-man player pool space (just like a typical minor-league deal requires space at a certain affiliate).
  • The active MLB roster will consist of up to 30 players (and at least 25 players) at the start of the season. After two weeks of play, that number goes down to 28. After two more weeks, it drops again to 26, with a 27th player available for double-headers.
  • Teams will travel with an unofficial 3-man taxi squad, the identity of which need not be disclosed. One player must be a catcher. There is no official designation or roster status associated with being a member of that group.
  • As usual, a player must be on a 40-man roster in order to be added to the active MLB roster.
  • Once a player is placed on the active roster, standard rules apply. Players eligible to be optioned can be sent back to camp just as if it were a minor-league affiliate. An optioned player must stay on optional assignment for ten days, unless called back owing to an injured list placement. Players who are not eligible to be optioned must be designated for assignment (and then traded or exposed to outright waivers) to be removed from the active roster.
  • The trade deadline is August 31st. ONLY players in the 60-man player pool may be traded. Any player that is traded must go into an acquiring team’s player pool. (As a practical matter, it seems there’s nothing to stop teams from adding prospects to the 60-man player pool specifically in order to trade them. The acquiring team would need to be capable of carrying such players in their own 60-man player pool while still fielding a 26-man active roster of capable big leaguers.)

Dodgers Have Diversified Slate Of Future Commitments

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2020 salary terms may finally be sorted out. But what about what’s owed to players beyond that point? The near-term economic picture remains questionable at best. That’ll make teams all the more cautious with guaranteed future salaries.

Every organization has some amount of future cash committed to players, all of it done before the coronavirus pandemic swept the globe. There are several different ways to look at salaries; for instance, for purposes of calculating the luxury tax, the average annual value is the touchstone, with up-front bonuses spread over the life of the deal. For this exercise, we’ll focus on actual cash outlays that still have yet to be paid.

We’ll run through every team, with a big assist from the Cot’s Baseball Contracts database. Prior entries can be found here. Next up is the Dodgers:

*Includes buyouts on club options over Joe Kelly, Max Muncy

*Reflects remaining portion of David Price salary owed by Red Sox

*Includes 2023 player option of A.J. Pollock (due $5MM buyout if he declines)

(click to expand/view detail list)

Universal DH Will Be Implemented For 2020

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After months of return-to-play discussions, a shortened 2020 season looks to be upon us — and with it comes the long-anticipated and highly divisive implementation of the universal designated hitter. National League fans and baseball traditionalists recoil at the idea, but both polls we’ve conducted on the universal DH have shown that fans are pretty evenly split on the notion. In our poll earlier this spring, some were open to the idea for 2020 alone if that was one of the health/safety conditions necessary to bring about a 2020 season of some form.

That proved to be the case. And while there was talk about implementing the DH in 2021 as well, that was only on the table in the jointly negotiated season proposals between MLB and the MLBPA. The 2021 universal DH went out the window when no agreement was reached and commissioner Rob Manfred implemented a 60-game season. The two sides could — and very likely will — revisit a 2021 implementation this winter. Most expect that the DH will be here to stay, although for the time being, it’s still a temporary quirk to the upcoming campaign.

The expected lifting of the transaction freeze on Friday could lead some clubs to add a new bat to this mix — Yasiel Puig remains unsigned, and trades will again be allowed — but here’s a high-level look at each club’s options (with links to more in-depth explorations)…

NL West

NL Central

NL East

Looking At The Rockies’ Post-2020 Payroll

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2020 salary terms may finally be sorted out. But what about what’s owed to players beyond that point? The near-term economic picture remains questionable at best. That’ll make teams all the more cautious with guaranteed future salaries.

Every organization has some amount of future cash committed to players, all of it done before the coronavirus pandemic swept the globe. There are several different ways to look at salaries; for instance, for purposes of calculating the luxury tax, the average annual value is the touchstone, with up-front bonuses spread over the life of the deal. For this exercise, we’ll focus on actual cash outlays that still have yet to be paid.

We’ll run through every team, with a big assist from the Cot’s Baseball Contracts database. Prior entries can be found here. Next up is the Rockies:

*Nolan Arenado may opt out after 2021

*Includes Charlie Blackmon 2022 & 2023 player options

*Includes buyouts on club options over German Marquez, Ian Desmond, Daniel Murphy, Jake McGee, and Bryan Shaw

*Includes buyout on mutual option in Wade Davis contract

 

(click to expand/view detail list)

Giants Have Trimmed Long-Term Payroll Obligations

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2020 salary terms still need to be sorted out. But what about what’s owed to players beyond that point? The near-term economic picture remains questionable at best. That’ll make teams all the more cautious with guaranteed future salaries.

Every organization has some amount of future cash committed to players, all of it done before the coronavirus pandemic swept the globe. There are several different ways to look at salaries; for instance, for purposes of calculating the luxury tax, the average annual value is the touchstone, with up-front bonuses spread over the life of the deal. For this exercise, we’ll focus on actual cash outlays that still have yet to be paid.

We’ll run through every team, with a big assist from the Cot’s Baseball Contracts database. Prior entries can be found here. Next up is the Giants:

*Includes buyouts on club options over Evan Longoria, Johnny Cueto, Buster Posey, and Wilmer Flores

*Reflects remaining portion of Evan Longoria salary owed by Rays

*Includes remaining signing bonus obligation to Johnny Cueto

(click to expand/view detail list)

The Slow Decline Of A Former Top-3 Pick

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With the third overall pick in the 2014 draft, the Chicago White Sox selected Carlos Rodon out of North Carolina State. Rodon was a consideration for the top overall pick in the draft, but the Astros and Marlins each went with a high school arm in Brady Aiken and Tyler Kolek. As the top college arm in the draft, Rodon came with high expectations and a presupposed shorter timetable for reaching the majors.

Sure enough, it didn’t take Rodon long to reach the majors. He was the second-fastest from the draft class to make his debut, trailing only Brandon Finnegan of the Royals (debuted in September of 2014). Rodon made his debut in 2015, along with other top-10 draft picks from 2014 like Kyle Schwarber of the Cubs, Aaron Nola of the Phillies, and Michael Conforto of the Mets. Rodon came out of the gate hot, going 9-6 in 23 starts with a 3.75 ERA/3.87 FIP.

Rodon has now played parts of five professional seasons with the White Sox, but he has yet to put together a complete campaign. All in all, he’s largely been a disappointment. For his career, he’s 29-31 with a 4.08 ERA/4.25 ERA with 8.8 K/9 versus 3.9 BB/9 across 529 innings. Rodon’s numbers fit comfortably at the back end of a rotation, but the White Sox hoped for much more out of Rodon.

Rodon’s track record cannot be separated from his injury history. A sprained wrist in 2016, biceps bursitis in 2017, shoulder inflammation when he returned in 2017 that bled into the 2018 season, and then Tommy John surgery that ended his 2019 season after just 7 starts. It’s been a rough road since making his debut.

Entering 2020, the 27-year-old Rodon is a legitimate afterthought. He’s lost velocity over the years, with his four-seamer peaking early in his career with a 94.2 mph average and dropping to 91.4 mph over his seven starts of 2019. He’s gone away from the sinker that was his trademark early on, relying more and more on a fastball-slider mix that profiles more like the repertoire of a late-inning reliever. As he returns from Tommy John surgery, it’s hard to know what kind of pitcher Rodon will be.

Because of the delay to the 2020 season, however, he will be healthy and ready to go when/if the seasons starts, per Daryl Van Schouwen of the Chicago Sun-Times. That’s good news for Rodon and the White Sox, though it’s unclear if there’s room for Rodon in the rotation. Lucas Giolito and Dallas Keuchel are locked into the first two spots in the rotation. Gio Gonzalez was given a $5MM contract to do what Rodon hasn’t been able to: provide innings. For the other two rotation spots, Rodon will have to beat out a pair of young arms in Reynaldo Lopez and Dylan Cease.

Lopez, 26, has taken his turn every fifth day for the last two seasons in Chicago, but the results haven’t been tremendous (4.64 ERA/4.83 FIP) – and he’s just a year younger than Rodon. Cease, 24, made his debut last year and struggled, but he remains a promising, hard-throwing righty. They’re slotted into the rotation for now, but there’s never been more uncertainty heading into a season than we face in 2020. Rodon could very well push for a rotation slot, but his future is no longer guaranteed. Michael Kopech could also join the fray, as Van Schouwen notes that the former Red Sox farmhand should be recovered from his own Tommy John surgery.

The fact is, the rotation is the biggest question mark of the White Sox roster heading into 2020 – despite the high-ceiling potential therein. Given the bizarre circumstances of the current climate, the bigger question is how much rope Chicago will give their young arms. With a shortened season and expanded playoffs, the White Sox have increased expectations. Fans will expect the Southsiders to join the crowded playoff field. To that end, the early games will matter like never before. A guy returning from injury like Rodon won’t have the leeway to round himself into shape. What’s worse, he might not have minor league games to provide that extra runway either.

If Rodon can come back as effective as pre-surgery, he won’t be the ace that some imagined, but he can hang in a rotation. Whether he’ll get that opportunity in Chicago is unclear. Injuries take their toll, and Rodon has been through the wringer. Whether through side sessions or spring training 2.0, Rodon will have to prove he’s ready to contribute.

If the season takes place, Rodon will have just one more season of arbitration eligibility before reaching free agency, and the White Sox will have to decide whether it’s worth giving him a raise on the $4.45MM (full-scale rate) he’s due in 2020. Rodon is still young enough to turn things around in Chicago, but the injuries are piling up, and time is running out.

Pirates Have Minimal Post-2020 Payroll Commitments

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2020 salary terms still need to be hammered out. But what about what’s owed to players beyond that point? The near-term economic picture remains questionable at best. That’ll make teams all the more cautious with guaranteed future salaries.

Every organization has some amount of future cash committed to players, all of it done before the coronavirus pandemic swept the globe. There are several different ways to look at salaries; for instance, for purposes of calculating the luxury tax, the average annual value is the touchstone, with up-front bonuses spread over the life of the deal. For this exercise, we’ll focus on actual cash outlays that still have yet to be paid.

We’ll run through every team, with a big assist from the Cot’s Baseball Contracts database. Prior entries can be found here. Next up is the Pirates:

*Includes buyouts on club options over Chris Archer and Gregory Polanco

*Does not include remaining contractual obligations to Felipe Vazquez (on restricted list and facing multiple criminal charges in multiple jurisdictions)

(click to expand/view detail list)

Creative Playoff Expansion Can Get a Deal Done

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Dr. Matt Swartz is a Labor Economist who has researched and published on MLB labor markets for over a decade at websites including The Hardball Times, FanGraphs, and Baseball Prospectus, as well as at MLB Trade Rumors. Matt created the arbitration salary projection model for MLB Trade Rumors, and co-created the SIERA pitching statistic available at FanGraphs. He has consulted for a Major League team since 2013, in addition to working in his day job as an economist in the cable industry. This article reflects his own opinion and not that of any of his employers or clients.

Previous posts: Resolving This Player-Owner Dispute Should Be Easy; MLB Collective Bargaining and Risk Sharing.

There is a way that players can get prorated salaries for a 72-game regular season and the owners can make enough money to only pay the equivalent of 68% of prorated salaries. We know the way that owners will agree to a deal with prorated salaries for 2020; they insist they need the revenue to make up for losses incurred during the regular season. While both owners and players have proposed expanded playoffs as a way to increase that revenue, they have been unable to create enough revenue for the owners to bite. I have a solution for this problem—start the playoffs earlier, add playoff teams, make the series longer, and reap the extra television revenue. There is more than enough there to get a deal done.

The biggest roadblock to completing a deal is the combination of the union’s insistence that players be paid on a prorated basis per regular season game, and the owners’ insistence that players take less than their prorated salaries due to absence of fans in the stands. Players have shown a willingness to extend the playoffs—effectively playing some games for free. Owners have shown some willingness to put on a 50-game shortened season with typical playoff structure, but have balked apparently at the risk of the players filing a grievance for not putting on as long a season as possible.

Eugene Freedman tweeted to me earlier in this series that the reason players were so insistent on prorated salaries is to avoid precedent. If this is true, the only way around this is finding more revenue sources—something the player proposals have hinted at, but not provided adequately to appease owners.

The owners have repeatedly centered on completing the regular season by September 27 and the World Series by the end of October, fearing that a second wave of COVID-19 in the fall could preclude the playoffs.

Fans have an additional concern that my proposal would resolve—they want to make sure that the World Series Champion deserves their title. A shortened season, combined with expanded playoffs, naturally increases the possibility that a mediocre team could walk away with the crown.

They could solve this by ending the regular season 10 days early to end on September 17, using doubleheaders and other ways to get to 72 games (or just shrinking the season further if the players are amenable). Then they would have 10 extra days to get in a lot more playoff games.

My proposal is that playoffs are expanded to 16 teams, but that all 15 series are Best-of-Seven series. On average, this will increase the expected number of nationally broadcast playoff games from 36 to 90 – a whopping increase of 150%. With $787 million reportedly at stake in television revenue for those 36 playoff games, it stands to reason that networks would pay at least half as much for the addition 54 games as the original 36, which brings in something like a whopping $590 million in extra revenue.

If players are content to simply get by on prorated salaries for 72 regular season games, they would receive about $1.84 billion in revenue. The owners’ extra playoff revenue places them in the equivalent position of 68% of prorated salaries. Marginal costs of operating these games are probably small enough to keep this only a couple percent higher. The owners almost certainly need the players to take a haircut smaller than 32%, so there is plenty of room for give in this approach. Even if networks were only willing to pay a third of the per-playoff-game rate, that would still be enough revenue to get owners to effectively pay the equivalent of 79% of prorated salaries. There is probably even room in there to give the players some playoff share, cover some marginal costs of games, and other things that could be required for this to be profitable to owners and acceptable to players.

As a result, the odds that an inferior team wins a given series are lower, and it becomes more likely that a deserving champion is crowned. The league could even take further advantage of the empty-stadium format by tilting home field advantage entirely towards the team with the superior regular season record.

I have researched home field advantage extensively, and have learned that rather than home crowd support or even last at-bats, the real reason home field advantage exists is that players are more familiar with their own parks. Teams who are home for a 7-game series will have a 59% chance of winning an evenly matched series already. A superior team certainly could easily have a 70% chance of winning a series in many cases.

This seems to be something that would accomplish the requisite situation for all parties, and there are many other ways that players could help teams add revenue without sacrificing their prorated salary demand. But the key is many more playoff games, since that is the only way owners make back losses they claim from the regular season, and the only way players do not have to surrender their principle of prorated salaries.

Reds Have Nearly $300MM In Post-2020 Payroll Promises

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2020 salary terms still need to be hammered out. But what about what’s owed to players beyond that point? The near-term economic picture remains questionable at best. That’ll make teams all the more cautious with guaranteed future salaries.

Every organization has some amount of future cash committed to players, all of it done before the coronavirus pandemic swept the globe. There are several different ways to look at salaries; for instance, for purposes of calculating the luxury tax, the average annual value is the touchstone, with up-front bonuses spread over the life of the deal. For this exercise, we’ll focus on actual cash outlays that still have yet to be paid.

We’ll run through every team, with a big assist from the Cot’s Baseball Contracts database. Prior entries can be found here. Next up is the Reds:

*Includes buyouts on club options over Joey Votto, Mike Moustakas, Eugenio Suarez, Wade Miley, and Tucker Barnhart

*Includes deferrals and buyout on mutual option in Nick Castellanos contract; Castellanos may opt out after 2020 or 2021

(click to expand/view detail list)

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